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Abstract 
 
Within a given conversation, children appear to think of labels as mutually 
exclusive. For instance, if they are presented with a familiar (e.g. shoe) and an 
unfamiliar object (e.g. whisk) and then are asked to pick the referent of a novel name 
(e.g. ‘Where is the hinkel?’), they choose the novel object. Various theoretical 
accounts have been proposed to explain this phenomenon and claim that it is a word-
learning strategy. The aim of the present thesis is to demonstrate that the difficulty in 
using multiple labels is the result of the inability to understand perspective. 331 
children predominantly between the ages of 3 and 5 years, were tested on a variety of 
referent selection tasks assessing their metalinguistic awareness, and theory of mind 
tasks assessing their metacognitive abilities. Results showed that 3- to 4-year-olds 
resisted applying two labels to the same object and applied the second name to un-
named objects. In contrast, 5- to 6-year-olds accepted both labels significantly above 
chance. The likelihood of a child applying two names to one object was strongly 
related to theory of mind performance and remained robust even after partialing out 
age and verbal mental age. Results were extended to two other populations; bilingual 
and ASD children. The present thesis showed that children overcome the confusion 
multiple labels bring once they develop an understanding of perspective. 
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Introduction 
 
It can be an object, a person or an entity. Either of these can have multiple 
names in everyday life. This realization might sound simple, but to be achieved, 
striking developmental changes need to take place in early childhood. Until then, 
children resist applying two names to the same thing. For example, they find it 
difficult to provide an alternative name (e.g. animal) to an object that has already been 
a given a name (e.g. dog), even though both names are familiar to children (Doherty & 
Perner, 1998). This phenomenon occurs because children are not yet able to realize 
that both words are related to the same thing and to each other. However, around the 
age of 4, children overcome this restriction and become able to actively use two words 
for the same thing. This shift co-occurs with other metacognitive developments and 
most importantly with the development of theory of mind. The understanding of 
having multiple names for an entity is crucial. This is because recovering from the 
confusion different labels bring affects both children and adults. The present thesis 
demonstrates when children develop the ability to recover from this confusion, the 
strong association with false belief understanding and further shows how a 
conversation can proceed without complex tracking of common ground. Thus, the 
focus of this research is to examine relevant dual naming difficulties in relation to 
theory of mind and accounts for the associated development. 
 
The Disambiguation Effect 
 
The disambiguation effect is the most widely studied phenomenon related to 
the tendency to consider terms as mutually exclusive (e.g., Markman & Wachtel, 
1988; Merriman & Bowman, 1989) and is present not only in children, but also in 
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adults. In the ‘disambiguation task’, children are presented with a familiar (e.g. shoe) 
and an unfamiliar object (e.g. whisk) and then are asked to pick the referent of a 
novel name (e.g. ‘Where is the hinkel?’). Children typically choose the novel object 
(e.g., Markman & Wachtel, 1988, Expt. 1). In other words, if the reference of the 
second name is ambiguous, children reduce the ambiguity of novel word meanings; 
they disambiguate.  
Before the first study using the standard disambiguation paradigm, children 
had already been shown to map novel words to novel objects. Carey and Barlett 
(1978) showed that 3- to 4-year-olds would pick the olive-green tray when their 
teachers, who were setting up for snack time, pointed at two trays asked them to 
bring the “chromium one, not the blue one, the chromium one” (see also Carey, 1978 
and Dockrell & Campell 1986) and Halberda (2003) has demonstrated that this 
pattern of fast mapping is present in infants as young as 17 months of age. In a series 
of studies, Markman and Wachtel (1988) used the standard disambiguation paradigm 
and showed that 3- and 4-year-old children tended to pick the novel object as the 
referent of a novel word nearly 80% of the time. Even when no novel object was 
present, children tended to assign a novel word to a part or a substance of the familiar 
object. This was one of the earliest demonstrations of disambiguation and Markman 
and Wachtel dubbed this phenomenon as “mutual exclusivity bias”. 
Merriman and Bowman (1989) described various potential effects related to 
mutual exclusivity. Apart from the disambiguation effect which is the most 
researched phenomenon, they also described the correction effect. According to this, 
children might remove a familiar word when presented with a novel word for an 
item. Another effect is called the rejection effect and according to this, children reject 
new words for an item they already have a name for. The restriction effect refers to 
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children’s tendency to not generalize new words as additional names for items that is 
already have an established name. Regarding the onset of mutual exclusivity, the 
authors argued that the bias develops in early childhood as a heuristic aiding word 
learning. According to this view, the purpose ME bias serves is to assist infants learn 
new words and activates right after some vocabulary has been built. This idea was 
further supported by Golinkoff, Mervis and Hirsh-Pasek (1994).  
To define the origins and the scope of disambiguation, various explanations 
have been proposed. The present thesis focuses on three main accounts: the lexical 
constraints, the socio-pragmatic, and the perspectival. The first account claims that 
children make assumptions about the relationship between labels and their referents, 
specifically that each referent has only one label. According to the second account, 
children make assumptions about speaker intentions, specifically that use of a novel 
word probably derives from the intention to refer to an unfamiliar object. Both 
explanations see disambiguation either as a strategy to learn new words or as a 
sophisticated way to interpret speakers’ referential intents. Thus, they share the 
notion that children engage in sophisticated thinking about words or mental states to 
disambiguate. The perspectival account, in contrast, differs in scope and views 
disambiguation as the result of cognitive immaturity. 
Importantly, there is a flip side to disambiguation: almost always an object 
has two labels as in the case of “rabbit” and “bunny”, or “woman” and “lady”. As we 
review below, younger children, those aged 3 and below, typically have trouble 
applying two words to the same referent in laboratory tasks. Rather, this skill is often 
not seen until 4 or 5 years of age. In what follows, I discuss how each of the three 
accounts of disambiguation differ in their explanation of that basic finding and how 
they suggest the change to more flexible application of two names occurs. In this 
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thesis, we argue that the perspectival account provides the most unified explanation 
of both children’s disambiguation and co-referential abilities, and test specific 
predictions made by this account.  Also, I examine the possibility that avoiding 
applying two names to the same object constitutes a word-using rather than a word 
learning phenomenon. 
 
Accounts of Co-reference and Potential Issues 
Lexical constraints account 
As mentioned earlier, Markman and Wachtel (1988) explained the 
disambiguation effect by arguing that children adhered to a mutual exclusivity bias. 
According to this principle, children assume by default that each object can have 
only one name. Thus, only a single referent can be assigned to a single word and 
children treat words as mutually exclusive. So, in the disambiguation task, for 
example, children tend to choose the object they do not have a name for (e.g., the 
whisk) as referent of a novel label, because they assume that the familiar object (e.g., 
the shoe) cannot have more than one name (Markman & Wachtel 1988). In other 
words, as children already have a name for one of the objects (e.g. the shoe), they 
exclude that object as the possible referent of the novel name and come to the 
conclusion that the speaker is referring to the other object – the one that they do not 
have a name for yet (see also Merriman & Bowman, 1989). This heuristic reduces 
the number of possible meanings considered for a novel word and may thereby aid 
word learning. 
There are various other studies on disambiguation addressing the lexical 
constraints account. In Halberda (2003), monolingual 14- to 17-month-old infants 
were presented with images of two objects, either a cup and a ball, or a car and a 
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‘dax’ (a phototube), and were asked to “look at the [cup/ball/car/dax]”. Children’s 
looking time at the novel objects increased in the presence of a familiar object when 
listening to a novel name. Infants younger than 17 months did not show this effect 
suggesting the onset of this phenomenon in monolinguals. Since the data showed 
disambiguation only in the older infants, the author concluded that younger infants 
build their vocabulary without a word learning strategy.  
Overall, most studies agree that children begin to disambiguate around the 
age of 17 months. In studies where younger children are shown to recognize novelty, 
this is not found to be connected with word learning and vocabulary consolidation, 
rather than a preference towards novelty (see also metanalysis by Lewis, Kristiano, 
Lake, Kwan & Frank, 2019). However, as is clear with regard to the lexical 
principles account, this hypothesis suggests that children use mutual exclusivity to 
infer the meaning of new words. When they encounter a novel word, a novel object 
and a familiar object, they exclude the familiar object as the possible referent of the 
novel word and come to the conclusion that the novel word refers to the novel object 
– the one that they do not have a name for yet (see also Merriman & Bowman, 1989). 
According to the account, the aim of this strategy is to reduce the number of possible 
meanings considered for a novel word, and thus aid word learning. Young children 
do learn overlapping terms though and this comes in contrast to the general principle 
of the bias (Waxman & Hatch, 1992; Clark, 1997; Deák & Maratsos, 1998). 
Proponents of this account argue, though, that the bias is being relaxed in the 
presence of adequate information implying to do so (Markman, 1989). A more 
serious issue with this account might be that these biases, which are argued to aid 
word learning of basic level categories, are considered to be specific to language 
(Golinkoff et al., 1992; Merriman & Bowman, 1989). This would mean that they are 
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specific to word learning, but this is not the case, as later findings demonstrate that 
the disambiguation effect occurs with idiosyncratic facts, too (Diesendruck & 
Markson, 2001). 
The socio-pragmatic account  
A competitor of the lexical constraints explanation is the socio-pragmatic 
account. Contrary to the former’s domain-specific approach to word learning, this 
account offers a domain-general approach of lexical acquisition that proposes that 
children rely on general socio-pragmatic understanding about the communicative use 
of novel labels and the referential intentions of their interlocutors (Tomasello, 2000). 
Thus, children do not use lexical principles to infer what new words mean. Instead, 
disambiguation is as a consequence of children reading other people’s 
communicative intentions (Bloom, 2000; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Tomasello, 
2000). Bloom and Lahey (1973) first underlined the complexity of word learning by 
proposing the idea of mutual dependency between form, content and use. In 1993, 
Bloom wrote, "cognitive development bring the infant to the threshold of language 
only in conjunction with other developments in expression and social connectedness" 
(p. 52). Bloom highlighted that the driving force that urges children to try to 
understand the meaning of novel words is their need to communicate and for this 
purpose, social context and social cues such as sensitivity to eye gaze, pointing, and 
speaker intention, are of vital importance.  
For example, young learners have been shown to attend to the direction of a 
speaker’s eye gaze to establish what the speaker is referring to (Baldwin, 1993). 
Akhtar, Carpenter and Tomasello (1996) also showed that children assign novel 
names to novel objects by trying to interpret speakers’ referential intentions. In their 
study, the researchers had 20-month-old children playing with three toys when their 
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mother and two experimenters were in the room. While the mother and one of the 
experimenters left the room were absent, a fourth toy was introduced. When they 
returned, they looked into a box containing the novel objects - including the fourth 
object - and said "I see a gazzer!" – aiming at no object in particular. In a later object 
selection task in which the child encountered again all four objects, children 
consistently assumed that the toy introduced during the mother and experimenter's 
absence was the referent for the word "gazzer." The authors attributed children's 
performance to deep understanding of other persons' referential intentions; children 
must have had apparently inferred that the object the adults had not seen during play 
must be the one being labelled as "gazzer." 
Thus, as children are sensitive to various communicative practices, they can 
judge speakers’ referential intentions in discourse contexts including not only new 
words, but new facts as well (Bloom, 1998). In order to infer what the speaker has in 
mind, children employ two principles proposed by Clark (1988, p. 319): (a) the 
principle of conventionality and (b) the principle of contrast. 
According to the principle of conventionality, children assume that there are 
specific forms in a language that speakers commonly use in order to convey certain 
meanings. For the sake of effective communication, a speaker tends to choose the 
expressions that most directly help addressees interpret the speaker’s communicative 
intent. Addressees, in turn, expect the speaker to use those expressions when 
inferring that intent. These expressions are “conventional linguistic forms used to 
express the respective implied meanings” (Diesendruck, 2005). In other words, 
according to the pragmatic account, the reason why children tend to exclude familiar 
objects as referents of novel names in the disambiguation effect, is due to their 
assumption that “if the speaker was referring to the object I have a name for, he/she 
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would have used the conventional name  that we both know, so he/she must be 
referring to the other one” (Diesendruck, 2005; Grassmann, Stracke, & Tomasello, 
2009).  
Moreover, whenever there is a conventional form that could be used to 
convey a certain meaning but a speaker uses a different one instead, children will 
assume it is because the speaker has a different contrasting meaning in mind. This is 
according to Clark’s (1990) principle of contrast and states that any two linguistic 
forms must contrast in meaning because they must arise from different underlying 
communicative intentions (Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). This principle is not 
specific to word learning and it is considered to be a pragmatic assumption about the 
use of words (Clark, 1990). 
There is much empirical evidence on disambiguation in relation to socio-
pragmatic principles. For instance, in the study of Diesendruck, (2005), 4-year-old 
children avoided two names for the same object when exposed to a novel word in a 
puppet’s presence but not in the puppet’s absence. A puppet was used during the 
experimental trials of the task to direct questions to children. Children did not avoid 
lexical overlap only when exposed to a proper noun in the absence of the second 
speaker – the puppet. The author suggested that children used their theory of mind 
(ToM) abilities to make assumptions about the puppet’s knowledge and her 
communicative intent (Diesendruck, 2005). 
As mentioned earlier, disambiguation has been shown to be not only specific 
to language. Diesendruck and Markson (2001, Study 2) showed that, contrary to the 
lexical constraints account, disambiguation does not occur only with novel words, 
but also with idiosyncratic facts. In this study children were presented with two novel 
objects. A puppet - either absent or present during the introduction of the objects - 
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asked for an object that was associated with either a novel name or a novel fact. In 
the fact condition, at first, children were shown two novel objects and were told a 
fact about one of them, for instance, “I keep this in the kitchen”. Then, they were 
asked to give the experimenter “the one that breaks easily”. In the label condition, 
children disambiguated, no matter whether the puppet was present or absent while 
the experimenter uttered the label of the first object. In the fact conditions, though, 
children only disambiguated when the puppet was present, but not when the puppet 
was absent during utterance of the fact about the first object.  
What seems to have played an important role in children’s inferences is the 
presence and the absence of the puppet. This becomes obvious in the puppet absent/ 
fact conditions mentioned earlier, where children did not disambiguate as reliably as 
they did in the other conditions. The researchers’ interpretations of this are based 
again on the pragmatic account; if the puppet was absent, it would not be possible to 
know how the object was previously referred to. Thus, children could not form a 
definite hypothesis as to why the puppet asked for the object the way he did 
(Diesendruck & Markson, 2001). As a result, children resorted to guessing. 
Scofield and Behrend (2007) investigated the pragmatic account and 
compared it with the lexical constraints accounts in a study which is one among the 
few ones that used novel names and novel facts within one study. According to their 
results, 2-year-olds disambiguated at levels that were above chance in the label 
condition (81%). They, however, disambiguated at or below chance levels in the fact 
condition (19%). However, 3- and 4-year-olds disambiguated at or above chance in 
all conditions, a pattern similar to that of Diesendruck & Markson’s (2001) study for 
3- and 4-year-olds. As can be seen, children of different ages disambiguated 
differentially novel words and facts. Scofield and Behrend (2007) rejected the 
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hypothesis that the pragmatic hypothesis can account for children’s disambiguation 
effect. According to their arguments, if the pragmatic hypothesis was valid, children 
would disambiguate novel words and novel facts similarly given that the same 
underlying process should show the same pattern of disambiguation. In addition, 
performance of children of different ages should also yield to similar patterns of 
disambiguation and disambiguation in words and facts should emerge similarly 
across ages. Because, if disambiguation resulted from children’s pragmatic ability to 
interpret contrasted referential acts, then contrast and not age would predict 
disambiguation. 
In line with this argument, de Marchena, Eigsti, Worek, Ono and Snedeker 
(2011) present evidence that different biases underlie disambiguation in words and 
facts. In their study, typically developing and children with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) were tested in an exclusivity paradigm investigating disambiguation 
for labels and facts. Contrary to Scofield and Behrend (2007), both word and fact 
conditions were administered to the same participants.  According to their results, 
disambiguation was much stronger for words than for facts. Moreover, the effects 
were uncorrelated, as disambiguation in words was associated with vocabulary size 
and disambiguation for facts was associated with social skills. De Marchena and 
colleagues reached the conclusion that pragmatics do not account for the 
disambiguation effect, but it might be either a lexical constraint or a domain-general 
learning function.  
No correlation when comparing performances was later confirmed by 
Kalashnikova, Mattock and Monaghan (2014), who made comparisons between the 
two effects among typically developing preschool children. They tested 3- to 4-year-
olds, 4- to 5-year-olds and 18- to 26-year-olds adults on word and fact 
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disambiguation. Results showed that younger children exhibited equal levels of word 
and fact disambiguation, but in older children and adults disambiguation followed 
different pathways: levels of word disambiguation were increasing, while fact 
disambiguation was decreasing with age. Both Scofield and Behrend (2007) and 
Kalashnikova et al (2014) found that word and fact disambiguation follow different 
paths. With regard to the developmental trajectory, in the age group where the two 
studies overlap they both find equal proportions of word and fact disambiguation. 
To sum up, the argument of the socio-pragmatic account is that pragmatic 
abilities play an important role in determining reference (see also Grassmann, 
Stracke & Tomasello, 2009; Grassmann & Tomasello, 2010). However, this does not 
automatically mean that pragmatic abilities can explain disambiguation. The 
important role of social cues and context in word learning is undeniable, but 
Diesendruck and Markson’s socio-pragmatic account alone cannot explain the 
pattern-differences in word and fact disambiguation which imply that disambiguation 
relies on quite separate principles. Also, it cannot explain why fact disambiguation 
does not follow a specific pattern throughout age. Lastly, there are populations that 
disambiguate despite of their impaired socio-pragmatic abilities (e.g. de Marchena et 
al., 2011; Scofield and Behrend, 2007). These findings might be rather problematic 
for the socio-pragmatic account. 
The perspectival account  
Both the lexical principles account and the socio-pragmatic account imply 
that even very young children can think about the relationship between words and 
their referents in a sophisticated way. However, there is reason to think they cannot 
do this. Doherty and Perner (1998) showed by using a vocabulary check that children 
are in the position to know two familiar names for certain things, such as truck and 
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lorry. But, after they have been provided with one of the two names, young children 
are unable to produce the other name (Alternative Naming Task). Most importantly, 
they demonstrated a close association between performance in the Alternative 
Naming Task and False Belief task which assesses children’s theory of mind.  
Theory of mind covers an important aspect in the present thesis. The most 
common test of children’s theory of mind is the “false belief task” and was first used 
by Wimmer and Perner (1983). In this task, children are required to predict where a 
character will search for an object while holding a false belief about its location. Data 
show that children reliably pass the task around the age of 4 (Wellman, Cross & 
Watson, 2001).  
Some theorists support that theory of mind is present since infancy - implicit 
theory of mind - and does not develop around the age of four (for an overview, see 
Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016; Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). Proponents of this 
account claim that children younger than 4 years of age fail the task not because they 
do not understand false belief, but due to methodological factors that are not related 
to theory of mind per se or because the tasks are not “sensitive” enough to capture 
children’s ability. The general format of the studies examining theory of mind in 
infancy is measuring mainly infants’ looking behaviour, rather than using explicit, 
verbal measures, and also occasionally involves violation of expectation (for 
example see Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Rubio-Fernandez & Geurts, 2013; 
Schuwerk, Jarvers, Vuori, & Sodian, 2016; Southgate, Senju & Csibra, 2007; 
Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012).  
Apart from exploring just looking times, interactive behavioural measures 
been developed that employ infants’ intentional interaction abilities, such as active 
helping and referential communication (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; 
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Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012; Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010). In these tasks, 
participants are introduced to a scene in which an agent does or does not witness an 
event. Then, children are given a verbal prompt and researchers then measure 
children’s spontaneous behaviours in response to the prompt. The behaviours might 
involve helping or pointing and are considered as a proxy for belief understanding. 
Proponents of implicit theory of mind claim that these behaviours are proof of 
genuine false belief understanding (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; Scott & 
Baillargeon, 2017), while empiricists deny that these responses constitute false-belief 
attributes in the first place; they support that children’s behaviour can be attributed to 
low level processes like preference towards novelty (Heyes, 2014) or simpler 
behavioural rules (Perner & Roessler, 2012). 
Work on implicit theory of mind is currently contentious and faces substantial 
replication issues. There are many recent studies which used similar or the same 
looking paradigms, but failed to demonstrate theory of mind abilities in children 
younger than 4 years old (Burnside, Ruel, Azar & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; 
Dörrenberga, Rakoczya & Liszkowskib, 2018; Grosse Wiesmann, Friederici, Disla, 
Steinbeis, & Singer, 2018; Kammermeier & Paulus, 2018; Low & Edwards, 2018; 
Priewasser, Rafetseder, Gargitter, & Perner, 2018). 
In their metanalysis, Wellman and colleagues (2001) examined fifteen years 
of research on the false belief task and showed that children under the age of 4 
cannot reliably pass the task and that there is no way to improve their performance 
through methodological modifications. The researchers chose data from 178 studies 
found in papers or reports and more than 4000 children were represented in total. 
According to the findings, at 2.5 years children were 20% likely to pass, 3 years and 
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8 months they were 50% likely to pass and at 4 years and 8 months they were 75% 
likely to pass.  
The research carried out below could be seen as a test of the claims for 
implicit theory of mind. Here, I examine the association between tests of mental 
perspective taking and linguistic perspective taking.  If explicit perspectival 
understanding emerges around four years, then associations should be revealed 
between the tests.  If it does not emerge then, then associations are unlikely, since the 
tasks involve very different demands and structure. In that case, explaining the 
association because of common non-conceptual aspects of the tasks would be 
challenging. Doherty & Perner (1998) and Gollek & Doherty (2016) already provide 
support for perspectival understanding arising around four years. The focus of the 
present thesis is on the more direct issue of different theories of referent selection.  It 
may be noted that the socio-pragmatic account is consistent with theory of mind 
emerging in infancy, whereas the perspectival account claims it arises around 4 
years.  
The concepts of representation and meta-representation are fundamental in 
relation to theory of mind and metalinguistic awareness. Pylyshyn (1978) defined 
meta-representations as “The process of ˊrepresenting the representational relation 
itselfˋ, or representing a representation as a representation (Perner, 1991).” (Doherty, 
2009, p. 214). A representation can constitute a statement, a thought about something 
or a picture of something (Gollek, 2014). A meta-representation, in turn, can be a 
statement about a statement, a thought about a thought or a picture of a picture. 
Meta-representation is closely related to theory of mind, as it is considered to be the 
critical ability required to pass the standard false belief task. 
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In the standard false belief task, which is used widely in this thesis, Sally puts 
her ball into a box and leaves the room. While she is away, her brother Tom, moves 
the ball from the box to the cupboard and then leaves, too. When Sally comes back 
children are required to predict where she will look for her ball. In this case, children 
need to distinguish between Sally’s mental state about the location of the ball and 
reality in order to answer correctly and pass the task. When Sally thinks that the ball 
is still in the box, she has a misrepresentation of the location of the ball. When 
children are in the position to understand that Sally can hold a belief different from 
reality, then they demonstrate meta-representational understanding, as they recognize 
that this situation can be thought as such and can be evaluated distinct from reality. 
Thus, the ability to represent someone else’s belief in one’s own mind and make 
belief-based judgements requires meta-representational skills. 
Representations include not only mental but also public representations (like 
utterances, pictures, etc.) (Sperber, 2001). Thus, having meta-representational skills 
includes understanding not only of thoughts, but also understanding of non-mental 
representations such as language. Metalinguistic awareness refers to the 
understanding of language as a carrier of meaning (Doherty & Perner, 1998) and 
according to Doherty (2009, p 82), it differs from theory of mind only in terms of the 
domain of application: metalinguistic awareness applies in language rather than 
mind. 
Doherty and Perner (1998) did show that metalinguistic awareness is related 
to false belief understanding and follows the same developmental path.  In their 
study, performance on the Alternative Naming Task correlated strongly with 
performance in the False Belief Task. In the case of the False Belief Task, children 
need to distinguish between their perspective that the object has been moved to a 
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new location and the character’s perspective who is unaware of the transfer. In the 
Alternative Naming Task, children need to provide a second name for an object they 
already have been given a name for. Psycholinguists point out that alternative labels 
put different perspectives on a referent (Clark, 1987; Tomasello, 1999), so in the case 
of the Alternative Naming Task, children are required to use two perspectives 
(labels) on the same object at the same time. Perner et al. (2002) have made a 
distinction between switching and coordinating perspectives. Children can switch 
between perspectives without noticing and this can be externally induced by other 
speakers. In the False Belief Task, for instance, changing the location of the object 
alters the child’s perspective. In the Vocabulary Check of the Alternative Naming 
Task, children switch between verbal perspectives without noticing, as the speaker 
uses alternate names. But to be able to produce a second name for an object they 
have just been given a name for, children are required to understand that there are 
perspectives and that is it possible to make use of both of them. 
The alternative naming task and the disambiguation task share a common 
component: a word is provided for an object for which the children already have a 
name. For example, the experimenter might say ‘This is rabbit. What else can it be?’. 
At that point, the object has been named (as rabbit) and the child has to provide an 
alternative name that they likely also know. Thus, in this task children are required to 
apply two familiar words to the same referent. This is similar to the case of the 
disambiguation task, when children are asked ‘Which is the jintoff?’. It is assumed 
by all three accounts of behaviour in this task that children supply their own name for 
the familiar object implicitly; an assumption that fits with the finding that children as 
young as 18 months implicitly name visually fixated images (Mani & Plunkett, 
2010). Having implicitly supplied a name, then, children need to decide whether to 
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also apply “jintoff” to the same object. In the disambiguation task, applying the novel 
word to the familiar object would require children to apply two co-referential labels 
for the same referent, but the task does not require children to do this.  In the 
Alternative Naming Task however, children are explicitly required to produce a 
second label for a single object. Younger children fail to do so.  
An explanation for performances on both tasks is provided by Doherty and 
Perner (2019). Their theory on mental files assumes that there is a tracking constraint 
which automatically prevents young children from applying a second label to an 
object that has been named before. This is motivated by the need to avoid multiple 
perspectives for a single object. Perspectival understanding allows children to 
overcome this constraint in situations where it is not appropriate. 
To examine the role of understanding perspective in reference, rather than the 
standard disambiguation task, Gollek and Doherty (2016) used a modified task that 
does require an understanding of perspective. In the ‘Pragmatic Cue’ task, devised by 
Haryu (1991), an additional cue is given indicating that the intended referent was the 
familiar object. Haryu showed children a novel and a familiar object (e.g., a lipstick 
holder and an apple), and told them that a puppet “is hungry. I would like to give her 
[the] heku [a nonsense word in Japanese]".  This added cue provided a clear 
indication that the intended referent was edible, i.e., the familiar apple. Despite this 
cue, 3-year-old children still chose the inedible novel object. These children also 
chose the novel object in a standard disambiguation task. In contrast, roughly half of 
a group of 4-year-olds and most 5-year-olds selected the apple. Gollek and Doherty 
replicated these findings and showed that the tendency to select the familiar object 
was specifically associated with performance on both the False Belief and 
Alternative Naming tasks. This suggests that although the disambiguation effect does 
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not require an understanding of perspective, resisting the tendency to select a novel 
object as referent of a novel word does. 
In Haryu (1991) the very different responses of the 3 - and 5-year-olds 
suggest that the older children were able to use pragmatic information and apply the 
novel word to the familiar object. Haryu and Imai (1999) suggest that younger 
children relied on lexical principles, while older children took socio-pragmatics into 
account. This differs from the standard socio-pragmatic claim that children do not 
use lexical principles but instead rely on pragmatic cues to speaker intention from the 
start (Bloom, 2000) and it is consistent with the perspectival account predicting that 
from around the age of four, children become able to utilise pragmatic information.  
According to the Principle of Contrast, “whenever there is a difference in 
form of a language, there is a difference in meaning” (Clark, 1978, p.1), or more 
simply “Different words mean different things” (1988, p.317).  Diesendruck and 
Markson (2001) add ‘because it is likely that they stem from two different underlying 
intentions.’ (p. 631), making clear that the pragmatic force of the principle derives 
from considering speaker intentions and results in children assuming that different 
words refer to different things. One could argue, however, that this assumption does 
not automatically follow from Clark’s principle of contrast, because she construes 
meaning in broader terms than reference. For Clark, two forms may have the same 
referent but contrast in meaning: in a hierarchy between dog and animal, for 
example, but also in terms of dialect, register and connotation; there are no true 
synonyms (Clark, 1988). However, in contexts similar to the disambiguation task, 
with two potential referents and no further indication of how the novel and familiar 
words might be related, the most plausible contrast is in reference rather than 
meaning.  
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In the Pragmatic Cue Task, however, an indication is given suggesting the 
familiar object as the correct referent, and thus any contrasts are alleviated and 
sameness in reference is promoted. In the task, it is indicated that the novel word still 
refers to the familiar object even though the familiar object already has a known 
name. The extra cue suggests that the novel and the known familiar name differ not 
because they refer to different objects, but because they have a different meaning but 
still share the same referent. Although this should result in children choosing the 
familiar object, still they do not do so until they are about four years old.   
Arguably, the Pragmatic Cue Task does not provide a totally unambiguous 
indication of the speaker’s intentions. The speaker may actually intend to refer to the 
inedible novel object, mentioning the puppet is hungry for reasons that will become 
apparent later (as would be the case if the novel object turned out to be a device for 
taking out apple cores). Alternatively, children may simply rely heavily on 
differences in linguistic form when reference is ambiguous; intentions are difficult to 
determine, whereas differences in words are not. A way to lessen these limitations 
would be to use a task where only one object was referred to, and two novel names 
were given. The intention to refer to this object would therefore be unambiguous. 
Whether or not the two words should be treated as synonymous or in some other 
relationship (e.g., one superordinate to the other) may not be clear, but their co-
reference should be. In such a case, the principle of contrast would predict that 
children should assume the words contrast but not in terms of reference. Subsequent 
information should indicate how they contrast in meaning, but not in reference.   
 
The Dual Naming Task 
Sameness in reference was clear in a task used by Savage and Au (1996). 
Their aim was to investigate whether children would suspend or honour the 
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hypothetical mutual exclusivity bias, when input directly contradicted this 
assumption. In their study, two different adults named a novel object e.g., the teacher 
named it as primate and later the experimenter named it as lemur.  The order of the 
speakers introducing the names was always the same with the teacher always 
introducing the first name. In the Production task, the experimenter pointed at the 
target object and asked “What is this?”. Then, in the Comprehension task, each child 
was presented with an array of four objects (e.g. the pink-horned lemur, a purple-
horned lemur, a triceratops and a flamingo) and was asked by the experimenter 
whether a primate was there. This occurred for both novel labels, children were 
always tested by the experimenter and the order that the labels were asked was 
counterbalanced.  
In the Production task, 80% of the children offered a label and they favoured 
the one introduced by the experimenter. In the Comprehension phase, half of the 3- 
to 5-year-old children would point to all the primates - label tested first - from an 
array but when asked to point to all the lemurs, they would pick only distractors. This 
occurred with the second name tested, regardless of which adult had introduced it. 
Furthermore, children consistently accepted the label that was tested first. Age 
effects were not investigated.  
Using a lexical principles explanation, the authors claimed that the children 
who accepted only one label might have used a heuristic; they decided to adhere to 
the hypothetical mutual exclusivity assumption until or unless more input was 
provided which would be sufficient for concluding that the two words were 
synonyms or belonged to other possible overlapping relations (e.g. class inclusion in 
the same hierarchy). In other words, children kept both labels in mind as equally 
plausible hypotheses and, as new information came in, they revised these hypotheses 
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by committing to the name heard first as the label for the target object. Then, because 
of the bias to assume words are mutually exclusive, children rejected the alternative. 
However, their data contradict their claim, because if any kind of “commitment” 
should occur, that would happen in the Production Task, where children were asked 
to produce a name for the target themselves. 
Savage and Au’s (1996) findings are difficult for the socio-pragmatic 
account, as it should predict no issues with the Comprehension task. In the 
Comprehension task, children witness two speakers using two different novel names 
to refer to the same target object. Then, one of the speakers makes two requests for 
the target using the names that children had been taught earlier. Given the fact that 
the referent of the two names was explicitly taught, children should find no difficulty 
in choosing the target in both requests. On the contrary, half of the children failed to 
do so.  
It could be argued that when at test, a single speaker using two words is 
confusing, and thus the findings result from the odd pragmatics of the experiment. 
Frank and Poulin -Dubois (2002) used a more pragmatically sensible procedure and 
their findings were comparable to Savage and Au. In a variation of Savage and Au’s 
Comprehension Task, two different adults named a novel object with two nonsense 
names (e.g., the teacher named a garlic press as mido and later the experimenter 
named it as gavi). Then, children were tested on whether they accept both labels or 
not. Also, intervening requests were added between the requests using the novel 
words.   
Unlike Savage and Au (1996) there was no Production Task. In addition, 
introduction of the objects was also different. In Savage and Au (1996), children saw 
only the training/target object during the introduction of the two novel labels. In 
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Frank and Poulin-Dubois (2002) study, though, children were presented with a series 
of four objects during the introduction phase. Two of the objects in the series were 
familiar to the children and two of them were unfamiliar. Then, each experimenter 
named the fourth object (target), which was unfamiliar, using a different nonsense 
name. Then, each child received two requests for the target object and two requests 
for the other two familiar objects. Last but not least, in Savage and Au (1996), only 
the experimenter (not the teacher) asked the requests for the target object. In Frank 
and Poulin-Dubois (2002), both experimenters asked for the target object using the 
nonsense name introduced by that interlocutor. 
Frank's and Poulin-Dubois' (2002) results are consistent with Savage and 
Au’s (1996) finding that half of the children did not accept both names for the same 
object despite the fact that they had witnessed two different adults naming the target 
object using different labels. Results were comparable even though age ranges 
among the two studies differed; Savage and Au tested 3- to 5-year-olds, while Frank 
and Poulin-Dubois tested 26- to 28- and 34- to 36-month-olds. Savage and Au did 
not examine age effects, but Frank and Poulin-Dubois found that their older children 
were more likely to pick the target in the first question and the distractor in the 
second question.  
This apparent increase in showing the effect, however, may have been due to 
younger children making other kinds of errors and not because they accepted lexical 
overlap. Frank and Poulin-Dubois only reported the times the distractor was chosen. 
Since only distractor choices were measured, we have no information on how 
children who didn’t pick the distractor in the 2nd request behaved. For instance, they 
could have chosen the target in both requests or failed in another way or have chosen 
randomly. Thus, it is unclear how many children actually succeeded the task. 
 28 
Kalashnikova, Mattock and Monaghan (2016) and Kalashnikova, Oliveri and 
Mattock (2018) also used a similar procedure where children were explicitly taught 
two novel names for the same novel object. The former examined 4- to 5-year-olds 
and the latter examined children between 26 and 34 months of age. These two studies 
showed that older children can pass the task (success around 80% of the time), but 
young children perform poorly (success in around 55% of the trials). Also, a great 
proportion of toddlers’ errors was not just picking the target in the first request and 
the distractor in the second, but other errors as well, such as picking the distractor in 
both requests or a familiar item in one of the requests. This adds weight to the 
speculation that the younger group of children in Frank and Poulin-Dubois’ study, 
also made errors mostly rather than accepted lexical overlap. 
In the above studies, different speakers taught two co-referential words, and 
then each asked for the object using their word. In this case, there are good reasons 
why different speakers would use different co-referential labels, either because they 
are expressing different intentions regarding the object, or they simply have a 
preferred term (Clark, 1997). If children are able to infer and use speaker intentions 
to disambiguate, they should be able to understand this. Moreover, the experience of 
different speakers referring to the same object by different labels is likely to be 
relatively common for children. The same object will be a cat, an animal, a pet, 
Tiddles, and so on. 
The perspectival account makes a distinction between perspective shifts that 
are induced externally, for example by two different speakers referring to an object, 
and deliberate perspective shifts on the part of the child (Perner et al. 2002). In 
particular, external perspective shifts can occur when one updates one’s belief (e.g., 
the marble is no longer in the box) or moves to a different vantage point (the chair is 
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now behind the table from my new point of view). These result from a change in or 
input from the environment. Analogous shifts occur with labels. Using a label 
explicitly or implicitly (e.g., Mani & Plunkett, 2010), or hearing someone else use a 
label constitutes taking a perspective towards the object (Clark, 1997; Tomasello, 
1999). For a conversation to work one needs to stick to a particular perspective. 
Perspective is considered to determine the way one views an object and the kind of 
inferences one is likely to make about it. For example, if an animal is individuated as 
bird, one will perceive it as an entity that can fly; however, if it individuated as a 
penguin one infers that it cannot do so (Doherty & Perner, 2019). In a conversation, 
if a speaker uses a new label – i.e. a new perspective - for an object previously 
named differently, comprehension is slowed or impaired (Metzing & Brennan, 2003; 
Kronmuller, & Barr, 2015). 
Thus, we assume there is a strong tendency in children, too, not to switch 
perspectives on an object once one is established. A perspective is established once 
an adult asserts a label on an object. Then, if the adult asserts another label on the 
object, usually children will adopt this label without protest1. Thus, when a second 
label is asserted by an adult, children are induced to switch labels, and thus 
perspectives. We suggest that for young children this is direct and unreflective, and 
thus an externally induced switch in perspective. 
Applied to Savage and Au’s task, the perspectival account suggests that an 
externally induced switch in perspective occurs when the second speaker teaches the 
child the second name for the object: children are induced to switch label from lemur 
to primate and thus can learn the second name. However, in the test phase, the adult 
 
1 Merriman and Bowman (1989) note that children occasionally reject the other label, but this is rare (see also 
Matthews, Lieven, Tomasello). 
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asks for the referent of a label but does not assert the label for any object. The way 
the first request is expressed (e.g. Can you give me ‘jintoff’?) leaves open the 
possibility that the first name can refer to any object. Typically, all children correctly 
pick the target in the first request following the introduction phase where this 
mapping was taught. Thus, a perspective has now been applied to the target. In the 
second request, though, young children tend to avoid applying a second perspective 
on the same object. Then, since the target already has a perspective on it and since 
the word in the second request is only weakly associated with the target, as it is 
recently learnt, they tend to apply the second name to the distractor. The familiar 
objects are not strong candidates either, as they also have a perspective on them; their 
actual familiar name which is acquired from experience and is deeply learnt.  
In other words, in the Introduction phase, the target receives two perspectives 
and children can switch from the first one to the second, but this occurs 
unreflectively because the speakers asserted these perspectives on the object. In the 
test phase, however, since the speakers ask for the object without asserting the label 
to any object, children who understand perspective are able to override the tendency 
not to apply two perspectives at the same time by endogenously switching 
perspective on the object if context suggests this is appropriate and thus pick the 
target under both requests.   
The present thesis 
In the present thesis, I addressed specific predictions the perspectival account 
affords in relation to this phenomenon. The main task I am using is called the Dual 
Naming Task and is based on Frank and Poulin-Dubois’ design. Experiments 1 and 2 
examined the prediction that success on the Dual Naming Task ask associates with 
performance on other tasks that require understanding perspective, specifically the 
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False Belief task and the Pragmatic Cue task. Comparing the Dual Naming Task with 
these two tasks is novel. Results showed a strong association between the tasks and 
with age was found.  
Second, I predicted that children only reject the second label when it is 
presented in the same conversation as the first label. A question that arose from the 
previous studies is how children handle the word applied to the distractor later. Do 
they forget that word mapping? Are they able to use that word correctly in a different 
conversation? In Experiment 2, I investigated these questions by adding a Retention 
task. Retention of the novel names was never examined before in the studies using 
paradigms similar to the Dual Naming Task (e.g. Frank & Poulin-Dubois, 2002; 
Savage & Au, 1994). In that task children were presented with the target and 
distractor only and were asked to select the referent of the second label, i.e. the label 
previously applied to the distractor. The perspectival account makes predictions in 
relation to children’s use of the words in question rather than learning, thus it 
predicts that there is no reason why they should not correctly choose the target if this 
second label is subsequently presented on its own. I found that children could pick 
the target in the Retention Task, although they had chosen the distractor in the Dual 
Naming Task. 
My third prediction was that children’s success on the Dual Naming Task 
would still associate with perspectival understanding even after modifying the 
procedure such that the target is more pragmatically reasonable to be chosen. In 
Experiment 3, I used three modified versions of our standard Dual Naming Task that 
are novel. First, I added back the intervening requests for familiar objects between 
the requests for the target (similar to Frank and Poulin-Dubois’ design) which were 
not included in Experiments 1 and 2. This was done because hearing two consecutive 
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requests for the same thing could have felt odd or unusual to children. Further, 
instead of having an experimenter and a puppet as speakers, I replaced the 
experimenter by another puppet. The aim was to alleviate the potential pragmatic 
conflict of having the first name given by a potentially more authoritative source--the 
experimenter. In the second version of the Dual Naming Task, there was only one 
difference; the target object (the one that receives two names) was not a novel object, 
but a familiar one, e.g. an apple. The aim was to see if children would still find it 
difficult to accept lexical overlap in a particularly realistic scenario: hearing two 
speakers naming a familiar object with its familiar name and a new name. Lastly, in 
the third version, additional “bridging” information was provided to indicate such a 
relation between the two taught labels that applying both names would be 
appropriate. Results showed that none of these factors influenced children’s 
performance; still performance on the different versions of the tasks associated with 
false belief understanding. Regarding learning of the names, the Dual Naming Task – 
Familiar Target showed that children found it difficult to learn the novel name if the 
target was familiar. 
Experiments 4 and 5 examined two different populations; bilingual children 
and children with Autism Spectrum Disorder. As bilingual children are exposed to 
more than one language, they might be expected to be more flexible when it comes 
to accepting and using two words for the same object. The fourth prediction the 
perspectival account affords is that False Belief and language measures such as the 
Dual Naming task both tap a common conceptual development, that is understanding 
of perspective. Arguably, this should be the same within any population regardless of 
the language background. In Experiment 4, the relationship between alternative 
naming and false belief remained strong, but contrary to the expectations, bilingual 
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children’s performance on the Dual Naming Task was particularly low. Similarly, in 
Experiment 5, I predicted that success in the Dual Naming Task for both the ASD 
and typically developing children will correlate with false belief understanding. 
Again, the Dual Naming Task proved to be particularly hard for the ASD children. 
Regarding bilinguals, difficulties with the Dual Naming Task were arguably 
attributed to low confidence stemming from not being tested in their strong language. 
In ASD children, I speculate their slower processing of words is the major factor 
impacting their performance. 
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Experiment 1 – The Dual Naming Task 
 
The aim of Experiment 1 is to replicate 3- to 5-year-old children’s tendency 
to avoid acceptance of two newly taught names for the same object within the same 
conversation, and to compare it to False Belief understanding as a measure of 
perspective taking. I adapted the procedure previously used by Savage and Au and 
Frank and Poulin-Dubois to be more pragmatically natural. In the learning phase the 
two co-referential labels were introduced by different speakers, the second of whom 
was not present when the first label was taught. This avoids the possible impression 
that the speakers disagree about what the referent should be called. In the test phase, 
referents were requested by each speaker using the word they had taught. This avoids 
pragmatic difficulties in interpreting one speaker’s use of two labels for one 
object. Unlike Frank and Poulin-Dubois (2002) we did not include requests for 
familiar objects between the different requests for novel object.  This would be 
pragmatically more natural, serving to de-emphasise the contrast between the co-
referential labels, but makes the procedure longer.  We introduce these requests in 
Experiment 3 to investigate whether they influence the effect. We refer to our 
adapted task as the ‘Dual Naming Task’.  We predict that 1) younger children will be 
less willing to use two names for the same referent within the same conversation, and 
2) performance on the Dual Naming Task and the False Belief Task will be strongly 
associated over and above age and verbal mental age. 
 
Method 
Participants. 
Sixty-six typically developing children participated, from a single school in 
Norwich, UK with a primarily working-class intake. The sample comprised 22 3-
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year-olds (14 girls; M= 43.2 months; age range = 37-47 months), 24 4-year-olds (15 
girls; M= 53.3 months; age range = 48-59 months) and 20 5-year-olds (10 girls; M= 
64.0 months; age range = 60-68 months). For this and the three subsequent 
experiments, inclusion criteria were informed parental consent and child assent 
immediately prior to testing. The exclusion criterion was teacher or parental 
indication of a special needs diagnosis. The stopping criterion was that all available 
children had been tested. Teachers reported that 10 children were bilingual; to assess 
possible influences of bilingualism we compare performance of bilingual and 
matched monolingual children for all three studies after the main analyses.  
Design. 
Children completed the Dual Naming Task, a False Belief Task and the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) 3rd Edition (Dunn & Dunn, 2009). They 
also completed a synonym rejection task (Doherty, 1994; see Perner et al. 2002 for 
discussion).  Performance on this task was comparable to that described in Perner et 
al., and did not associate with other tasks employed here.  For brevity we do not 
discuss it further here. Task order was counterbalanced across the participants, with 
the BPVS administered last. 
Stimuli. 
Fourteen familiar and 4 novel objects were used. The unfamiliar objects were 
unusual toys and household objects (Appendix A). The presentation of the stimuli 
was fully counterbalanced. Also, a hand-puppet was used as a second speaker 
(Appendix D). Puppets have been widely used in studies examining mutual 
exclusivity, playing an active role throughout the experimental procedure by 
introducing labels and posing questions to the children (see Diesendruck & Markson, 
2001; Diesendruck, 2005). A small cardboard model was used as the puppet’s house. 
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Two Playmobile® figures, a box, a tiny cupboard and a small ball were used for the 
False Belief Task. 
Labels. 
The novel words were disyllablic words (jintoff, perner, hinkel, cheedor) 
taken from Gollek and Doherty (2016). The familiar words were bunny, rabbit, mug, 
cup.  
Procedure.  
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. The experimenter and 
the child were sitting at a small table and the child was always sitting opposite the 
experimenter. At the beginning of the first session, the experimenter initiated small 
talk to establish rapport.  
Dual Naming Task.  
The Dual Naming Task included a novel-names condition and a familiar-
names condition, administered in counterbalanced order. Each condition comprised 
two trials yielding four trials in total. In the Novel-Names Condition a puppet named 
Jimmy was introduced, then sent to sleep in his house.  It was made clear that the 
puppet could not hear anything while in his house. Particularly, the experimenter said 
while showing the puppet to the child “This is my little helper, Jimmy the Puppet! 
However, he is so tired, he goes straight to bed to take a nap.” At this point, the 
experimenter put the puppet into the house and made sure the door looked closed. 
Then said to the child “And remember, when he is in his house and he is sleeping, he 
can’t hear anything!”. To establish the child believed the puppet was unaware of the 
conversation taking place outside the house, the experimenter asked the child directly 
“Do you think Jimmy can hear us?”. If the child’s answer was negative, then the 
experimenter proceeded to the presentation of the objects. Only if the answer was 
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positive, the experimenter reminded the child that the puppet cannot hear anything. 
To enhance this knowledge, she pretended she was calling the puppet by its name 
and was expecting Jimmy to present himself, if he was indeed listening. Specifically, 
she said “I don’t think Jimmy can hear us. Let’s try this: Jimmy! Jimmy, can you 
hear us?”. As the puppet would not reply, the child was convinced he could not 
listen. This act was repeated if needed until the absence of the puppet was fully 
established and this procedure was repeated at the start of each experimental trial. 
After the introduction of the puppet, the experimenter said “Now let’s have a 
look at some cool things” and showed the child two familiar and two unfamiliar 
objects. The experimenter said “look at this one” for the first three objects. The child 
was allowed to explore each item in turn for up to 25s to minimise possible novelty 
effects. The experimenter then labelled the fourth object three times using a novel 
name, e.g. “Look at the hinkel…you have a hinkel…you are holding a hinkel”. 
Immediately after, the puppet emerged from his house, took the object, handed it 
back to the child and labelled it using a different novel name (e.g. jintoff), again in 
three consecutive statements. Thus, the child heard two novel names for the target 
object (Figure 1). 
The naming events were followed by a test phase (Figure 1). All the objects 
were placed in a row on a tray. The target unfamiliar object appeared in each of the 
four possible positions across trials, with the distractors randomly distributed. On 
half the trials the experimenter asked the child to indicate the target object using the 
label that she had taught. The objects were then placed into a bucket and the puppet 
asked the child to indicate the target object using the label that he had taught.  In the 
other half of the trials the order of the experimenter and puppet requests was 
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reversed. Thus, the child received requests for the same object from the experimenter 
and from the puppet using the novel name each had used in the training phase.  
 
Figure 1. Example of a training and test phase in the Dual Naming Task. 
 
The procedure in the familiar-names condition was identical to the novel-words 
condition except that all objects were familiar to children and the target object was 
named using familiar co-referential words.  
Each target was assigned two labels that were held constant across children, 
order of presentation of the two labels counterbalanced. Familiar names trials and 
novel names trials were alternated in a sequence balanced Latin square design. 
Identity of the first speaker was varied independently of trial order. 
False Belief Task. 
This task was the same as used in Gollek and Doherty (2016) (see also 
Appendix D). The following script was used: 
 “Now look, this is Sally and this is Tom. They have a box and a cupboard. Sally has 
a ball. Sally puts her ball into the box and then she goes to play outside. Now, Tom 
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picks up Sally’s ball from the box and puts it in the cupboard. Then Tom goes away. 
Look, Sally is coming back.” 
Each child was asked three questions in order: 
Belief question (test): Where will Sally look first for her ball? 
Reality question (control): Where is the ball really?  
Memory question (control): Where did Sally put the ball in the beginning?  
Children had to answer all three questions correctly to pass the task. 
Standardized measures. 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale III (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) was 
individually administered and is used as a measure of participants’ receptive (hearing) 
vocabulary for Standard English. Each participant was presented with colourful 
illustrations on a page and will be asked to select the picture that is considered to be 
the best illustration of the word that will be stated by the experimenter. The reliability 
and validity of this measure is widely established. 
 
Results 
Preliminary analysis indicated there were no effects of task order or gender. 
Dual Naming Task. 
Children were considered to succeed on a given trial if they picked only the 
target - the object that received the two novel names - as the referent of both the first 
and second request. Children’s choices of the distractor or a filler object in the second 
request were coded as a ‘non-target responses’. All children selected the target object 
on the first request in both conditions.  On the second request of each trial, choice of 
target was close to ceiling (95.5%) in the familiar words condition, but close to chance 
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51% (SE= 0.04) in the novel words condition. This difference between the two 
conditions was statistically significant; t(65) = 8.4, p < .001. In the novel names 
condition, 36% of children failed both trials, 26% failed one trial, and 38% passed 
both trials. The distractor was chosen 99% of the time a non-target response was made 
and no child refused to pick or point at an object. 
 Whether the experimenter or puppet made the second request made no 
significant difference to the likelihood of selecting the target (52% for the 
experimenter, 48% for the puppet). 
False Belief Task. 
Forty-one out of 66 children passed the false belief task (62%). Nine children 
failed one and two children both of the two control questions and were 
conservatively scored as not passing the task as stated above.  
Developmental trajectory. 
Performance according to age is shown in Figure 2.  The performance of the 
3- and 4-year-old children was at or below chance with success in 34% of the trials, 
t(20) = 1.5, p < .137, and 48% of the trials, t(22) = 0.24, p < .814 respectively. The 
performance of 5-year-olds was significantly above chance, t(21) = 2.2, p < .042. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean success on the Dual Naming and False Belief Task in relation to age. 
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Table 1 
Correlations between tasks (correlation after partialing out age and VMA) 
 BPVS False Belief Task Dual Naming 
Task 
Age .63** .69** .42** 
BPVS  .51** .12 
False Belief 
Task 
  .44** 
 
 
Comparison of the tasks. 
Dual Naming and the False Belief performance were substantially correlated 
(Table 1; r = 0.44, n =66, p < .001) and remained so after age and verbal mental age 
(r = 0.34, p < .01) were partialed out (Table 1). 
 
Discussion  
Compared to their older peers, young children found it hard to use two names 
for the same object correctly within the same conversation. Importantly, however, 
children’s ability to pick the target on both requests was strongly associated with 
their false belief understanding. These results are problematic for the pragmatic 
account, as although children were provided with an unambiguous indication that the 
target was the intended referent of both requests, the young children still picked the 
distractor. The lexical principles account could accommodate these data; the younger 
children avoid picking the distractor and this behaviour should aid word learning. 
However, it remains to be shown whether this is indeed a word learning 
phenomenon. Although Savage and Au supported this claim, they did not test the 
learning of the words in question. Another important issue with the lexical principles 
account is that it cannot explain the relation to false belief understanding. The 
*     p < 0.05. 
**   p < 0.001. 
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present results, however, support the perspectival account: the ability to apply two 
names to a single object is strongly associated with the ability to take someone else’s 
perspective in the false belief task which emerges at four years of age.   
However, the procedure does not allow us to make an unambiguous claim 
about the cases where children failed to apply two names to a single object. In the 
case that a child selected the distractor when prompted with the second name, we do 
not know if this is because they remember both names but fail to apply the second, or 
whether they just do not remember the second name.  
In their study, Savage and Au claim that children learn both words, but later 
delete one; they temporarily keep both labels in mind as equally plausible hypotheses 
and as new information came in, they revise these hypotheses by committing to the 
name heard first and rejecting the alternative. Both their prior data and our current 
data show that children do hold both words in mind, since they always reply 
correctly to the first request irrespective of which label was used. However, when 
Savage and Au report that “children seemed to keep both labels in mind for a short 
while … and then decide on the label that was heard first” (p. 313), they give no 
information about what happens to the label heard second.  What is implied is that by 
the end of the procedure children should no longer remember the second label, as 
they have revised their hypotheses. The perspectival account makes no prediction 
about retention and provides no specific reason why children should delete the 
second word. Rather, if children’s behaviour results from difficulty applying another 
perspective to the object, younger children, who have more difficulty with 
perspective taking, should not be able to use the second word correctly in the Dual 
Naming Task. We examine these possibilities in Experiment 2.  
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Experiment 2 – Examining Retention 
In this experiment we tested whether the young children remembered both 
words by adding a retention task. We also added the Pragmatic Cue Task by Gollek 
and Doherty (2016), which has provided the prior evidence for the perspectival 
account of labelling, as an additional measure of children’s referent selection abilities. 
Adding a retention task to the Dual Naming Task and comparing performances with 
the False Belief tasks and Pragmatic Cue task is novel. Our first goal, then, was to 
replicate the results of Experiment 1 and directly test whether both younger and older 
children retained both of the names initially applied to the target object. My second 
goal was to examine the prediction of the perspectival account that performance on the 
Dual Naming Task, Pragmatic Cue Task and False Belief Task is strongly associated 
over and above age and verbal mental age. My third goal was to test the prediction 
that, in the Retention Task, children would be able to properly use the name incorrectly 
applied to the distractor in the Dual Naming Task. 
 
Method 
Participants. 
Eighty-seven typically developing children from a single school in Norwich, 
UK with a primarily middle-class intake, participated. Inclusion, exclusion, and 
stopping criteria were as in Experiment 1. The sample comprised 25 3-year-olds (13 
girls; M= 40.7 months; age range = 35-47 months), 20 4-year-olds (8 girls; M= 54.5 
months; age range = 48-59 months), 26 5-year-olds (14 girls; M= 66.0 months; age 
range = 60-71 months), and 16 6-year-olds (8 girls; M= 74.4 months; age range = 72-
77 months). Teachers reported that 15 children were bilingual. 
Design. 
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Children completed the Dual Naming Task, the Pragmatic Cue Task (Gollek 
& Doherty, 2016), two False Belief Tasks and a short Retention Task. The 
experiment comprised two sessions of up to 15 minutes each. Order of tasks was 
counterbalanced with the constraint that each session had one referent selection task 
and one False Belief Task. The Retention Task was administered five minutes after 
the Dual Naming Task. The British Picture Vocabulary Scale III was administered 
last. 
Stimuli.  
Twelve unusual toys/household objects and 20 familiar objects were used 
(See Appendix B). 
Labels. 
The novel words (bubit, welne, tachte, puhne, blicket, ente, boskot, cheedor, 
hinkel, flinder, jintoff, momtick) were taken from Gollek (2013).  
Other Materials. 
    A hand-puppet was used as a second speaker (Appendix D). A small 
cardboard model was used as the puppet’s house. Two Playmobile® figures, a box, a 
tiny cupboard and a small ball were used for the False Belief Task Ι and two Lego® 
figures, two carton boxes and a teddy were used for False Belief Task II. 
Procedure. 
Dual Naming Task. 
 The design was identical to that of Experiment 1, except there were 4 novel-
name trials rather than 2.  
 Retention Task. 
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Children were presented with the target and distractor objects from each dual 
naming task trial, in the original sequence. The experimenter asked the child to point 
to an object using the label used in the second question of the test phase.  So, if for 
instance, a child had applied the second label used in the Dual Naming Task to the 
distractor, that would be the label used in the Retention Task. 
Pragmatic Cue Task. 
The child was presented with a familiar object (e.g., an apple) and an 
unfamiliar object (e.g., a whisk) and was told ‘‘Jimmy is hungry and would like a 
momtick; please give Jimmy a momtick”. Four trials paired novel objects with 
familiar objects that would satisfy the puppet’s implied need (hungry, sleepy, cold 
and thirsty). Presentation of objects (left/right) was counterbalanced. 
False Belief Tasks. 
False Belief Task 1 was the same as in Experiment 1. False belief task 2 
followed the same general format, with different characters (Lisa and Tony), object 
(a teddy) and locations (red and yellow boxes) (Appendix D). 
Standardized measures. 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale III (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) was again 
administered and is used as a measure of participants’ receptive (hearing) vocabulary 
for Standard English. 
 
Results  
Preliminary analysis indicated there were no effects of task order or gender. 
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Dual Naming Task. 
Performance both on the first and second request of the familiar names 
condition approached ceiling; only one child choose a distractor on a single trial on 
the second request. In the novel words condition two out of 87 children picked a 
distractor on a single trial on the first request. For the second request, 33% of 
children picked the target in all four trials. The remaining children showed a spread 
of performance, as can be seen in Figure 3. On trials on which the target was not 
chosen, children picked the distractor 97% of the time. Whether the experimenter or 
puppet made the second request made no significant difference to the likelihood of 
selecting the target (53% for the experimenter, 51% for the puppet.) 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of children who chose the target (Dual 
Naming Task) and the familiar object (Pragmatic Cue Task) in one, 
two, three, four or no trial. 
 
Retention Task. 
Children picked the target object on 82% of trials. Performance on the four 
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that although they chose the distractor in the Dual Naming task, they had 
nevertheless correctly mapped the word to the target object.  
Pragmatic Cue Task 
Children correctly picked the familiar object on 71% of trials. Sixty-seven 
percent of the children picked the familiar object on either three or all four trials, 
13% of the children succeeded in 2 trials, 15% of the children on only one, and only 
5% of children failed all trials of the Pragmatic Cue Task (Figure 3). 
Developmental trajectory. 
All tasks correlated strongly with chronological age and verbal mental age 
(see Table 2). Figure 4 shows performance compared to chance.  The 5- and 6-year-
olds were above chance on both tasks; younger children were at chance.  
 
 
Figure 4. Performance on novel-names condition of the Dual Naming Task and the 
Pragmatic Cue Task by age. *p < .05; **p = .001. 
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Table 2 
Correlations between tasks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
False Belief Task. 
Children passed 67% of false belief tasks: of 87 children, 57 passed both False 
Belief tasks, 3 children passed only 1 false belief task and 27 children failed both 
tasks. Ten children failed one or both control questions on the first false belief task and 
four children on the second false belief task. 
Comparison of the Tasks. 
Performance on all three main tasks correlated (see Table 2).  
 
Discussion  
As in Experiment 1, younger children were more likely to fail to apply two 
different novel names to the same object than older children. Also, performance on 
the Dual Naming Task, False Belief Task and Pragmatic Cue Task were strongly 
 BPVS False 
Belief  
Dual Naming  Pragmatic 
Cue  
Age 
 
.82** .54** .47** .65** 
BPVS 
 
__ .60 ** .53** .70** 
False Belief  
 
 ___ .70** .82** 
Dual Naming  
 
 .56** ___ .66** 
Pragmatic 
Cue 
 .70** .45** ___ 
Note: Correlations after partialing out age and verbal mental age are presented below the diagonal. 
*   p < 0.05. 
** p < 0.001. 
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associated over and above age and verbal mental age. Further, data from the 
Retention task suggest that all children retained the initial word-object mappings 
presented by both the experimenter and the puppet – they just failed to use both 
words correctly within the same particular conversation. However, the Retention task 
falls short of being a rigorous test of whether children had retained the second label.  
Children may recognise that a new word was only taught for the target, not the 
distractor, and choose it when presented with a novel word.  Even if this were so, the 
retention task shows that children recognised that the second label had been taught 
for this object.  Moreover, younger children were prepared to select that object when, 
but only when, a coreferential word had not previously been used in the 
conversation. 
Experiment 2 lends additional support to the perspectival account by 
replicating the findings of Experiment 1.  It also confirms a strong relationship 
between the two different types of referent selection tasks, and the false belief tasks. 
Finally, it suggests, contrary to Savage and Au, that children in this age group were 
able to retain two alternative names for one object throughout the procedure.  
However, it might still be argued that children picked the distractor as the 
referent on the second request of the Dual Naming task for pragmatic reasons. After 
children handed the target in the first request, in the second request they encountered 
two competing cues: 1) the word used by the second speaker was also for the target, 
2) but if the second speaker wanted to refer to the target again, it would be more 
natural to refer to it using the name she had just heard from the first speaker in the 
first request.  
Having two speakers, the second of whom first used his word without 
awareness of the first speaker’s word helped to minimise this possibility, since the 
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speakers may have a preferred term for the object or want to present the same object 
from a different perspective.  Experiment 3 added two additional measures to 
minimise pragmatic factors which might lead to selection of the distractor. 
We added intervening requests for the familiar objects between requests for 
the target. These intervening requests de-emphasise the use of different labels, and 
also make it unlikely that children will assume the second speaker is disagreeing with 
or challenging the first speaker’s label. Secondly, in the first two experiments the 
first label was given by the experimenter, a potentially more authoritative source.  
Which speaker used the second label at test made little difference to performance, as 
analysed above. Nevertheless, in Experiment 3 both speakers are puppets. Our first 
hypothesis is that the addition of the intervening requests will not change 
performance. Our second prediction is that having two puppets as speakers will result 
in performance equivalent to the previous experiments. 
In the following experiment, we decided to explore two additional scenarios; 
firstly, how will children behave if the target is a familiar object and secondly, 
whether they would pick the target more if they were provided with additional 
information making it even clearer that both taught names refer to the same target.  
For this purpose, I constructed two novel tasks; the Dual Naming Task – Familiar 
Target version and a Dual Naming Task – Bridging information version.  
In the Dual Naming Task – Familiar Target version, the target object was a 
familiar object (e.g. car) and the distractor remained novel. Children received two 
names for the target; the object’s actual familiar name (i.e. car) and another novel 
name (e.g. lozee). This version of the task simulates real life instances of dual 
naming, where typically a familiar object will be given an unfamiliar name and 
assesses whether the dual teaching effect occurs when one name is familiar.  I 
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expected that when familiar name was used, children would always pick the target 
regardless of whether it was used in the first or second request.  With novel names, I 
expected that young children would be less likely to accept a novel name for the 
same familiar target, as a well-known word is likely to supplant a weakly-learned 
word regardless of when it is introduced into the conversation. The perspectival 
account still predicts a strong association between overall success in this task and the 
false belief tasks.  
In the Dual Naming Task – Bridging information version, we provided 
children with a clear indication that both taught names refer to the target. In everyday 
life, it is common that parents tend to avoid multiple labels when talking to children 
in order to simplify their language efforts and communicate effectively. However, it 
is also common that when parents do use multiple names, they will also use labelling 
strategies to mark the occasion. In this way, they usually provide additional 
information about why two names both refer to the same object (see Callanan & 
Sabbagh, 2004). The strategy we are going to test in this experiment is called 
“bridging” and its purpose is to explicitly describe the relation between two novel 
words such that it is clear that both are appropriate referents for a particular object 
(e.g. A dog is kind of an animal; see Adams & Bullock, 1986; Callanan,1985).  
From a socio-pragmatic point of view, this procedure would help children 
perform better by accepting both names for the target more frequently. This would be 
because they would have been given information about how the words relate to each 
other, which is an even more unambiguous indication that the target is the intended 
referent of both names. The perspectival account does not predict this, however. In 
contrast, it predicts that still only children who have developed a false belief 
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understanding will be able to use this additional information and apply both names to 
the target.  
Summarizing the above points, my predictions for this experiment were the 
following: 
1. In the Dual Naming Task, having two puppets as speakers and adding intervening 
requests would not alter children’s performance. 
2. In the Dual Naming Task – Familiar Target, children would choose the target as a 
referent of a novel name less if this target was a familiar object. 
3. In the Dual Naming Task – Bridging information, providing additional bridging 
information would not alter children’s performance. 
4. In all three tasks, performances would still correlate strongly with success in the 
False belief Tasks. 
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Experiment 3 – Pragmatic Manipulations 
Method 
Participants. 
Fifty typically developing children participated, from a single school in 
Norwich, UK with a primarily middle-class intake. The sample comprised 28 2- to 3-
year-olds (15 girls; M= 40.3 months; age range = 30-47 months) and 22 4- to 5-year-
olds (10 girls; M= 56.6 months; age range = 48-67 months). Teachers reported that 
11 children were bilingual. 
General Task Design. 
There were two sessions of at most 15 minutes.  The first session included the 
Dual Naming task, one False Belief Task and the Retention task; the second session 
included a second False Belief Task and two variants of the Dual Naming Task; a 
Dual Naming Task where the target was a familiar rather an unfamiliar object, and 
another version where children received additional information about how the names 
taught relate to each other. Each Dual Naming Task was accompanied by a Retention 
task administered five minutes after each Dual Naming Task. The order of the main 
tasks in the second session was counterbalanced. The British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale III (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) was administered last to all participants. 
Stimuli.  
Sixteen unusual toys/household objects, and 32 familiar objects were used 
(see Appendix C). 
Labels. 
The novel words (kern, blicket, boskot, pafe, tever, eder, pabe, coodle, lozee, 
jintoff, cheedor, ente, montick, hinkel, kuble, delsy) were taken from Hosrt Noun 
Database and Gollek (2013).  
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Other Materials. 
Two hand-puppets were used as speakers. A small cardboard model was used 
as the puppets’ house. Two Playmobile® figures, a box, a tiny cupboard and a small 
ball were used for the False Belief Task Ι and two Lego® figures, two carton boxes 
and a teddy were used for False Belief Task II. 
Procedure. 
Dual Naming task. 
This task had two modifications: 1) both speakers were puppets, operated by 
the experimenter; 2) for half of the trials children heard requests for familiar objects 
between requests for the target. For these two intervening request trials the first 
puppet asked the child to point out a familiar object, then the target (e.g., "Where is 
the ball? ... Where is the hinkel?").  Then the other puppet asked for the other 
familiar object, then the target (e.g., "Where is the shoe?... Where is the jintoff?"). 
The other two trials followed the procedure in the previous experiments; children 
received consecutive requests for the target object from each puppet using different 
labels.   The puppets consistently used the labels they had taught in the training 
phase.  Which puppet spoke first was alternated between trials. Half of the children 
had the Intervening Request trials first, and half the standard trials first. The 
Retention Task and the two False Belief Tasks were identical to Experiment 2. 
The Dual Naming Task – Familiar Target. 
The procedure of this task was identical to the original Dual Naming Task, 
where children receive two different names by two different speakers for the same 
object and then each speaker asks for the object using the name each had introduced. 
The second speaker is absent while the first speaker introduces the first name. The 
difference in this experiment was that the target object (the one that received two 
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names) was not a novel object, but a familiar one, e.g. a ball. In the Introduction 
phase, this familiar object was given two names by the two speakers; the 
experimenter for example called it by its actual name and the puppet called it by a 
novel name (e.g. momtick). Speakers introduced the familiar or the novel names 
interchangeably; in half of the trials the novel name was introduced by the 
experimenter and the for other half of the trials, the novel name was introduced by 
the puppet. Then, in the test phase, each speaker asked for the target using the name 
each had used in the Introduction phase. The order of the speakers making the first 
and second request was counterbalanced. The third object - distractor - remained 
unnamed. The task comprised four trials. 
The Dual Naming Task – “bridging” information. 
The procedure of this task was identical to the original Dual Naming Task, 
except of one difference; in the Introduction phase, when the puppet named the target 
object, he also provided additional “bridging” information that indicated a relation 
between the two taught labels. For example, after the experimenter has labelled the 
target object using one novel name (e.g. blicket), the puppet would say “Look! A 
hinkel! That’s a kind of blicket!”. We also added a familiar names condition, where 
all labels and objects were familiar. For example, after one speaker would say 
“Look! An animal!” and the other speaker would say “Look! A cat! That’s a kind of 
animal!”.  Half of the children had the familiar names condition first, and half of the 
children the novel names first. The order of the speakers making the first and second 
request was counterbalanced. Each condition comprised two trials. 
False Belief Tasks. 
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False Belief Task 1 was the same as in Experiment 1. False belief task 2 
followed the same general format, with different characters (Lisa and Tony), object 
(a teddy) and locations (red and yellow boxes). 
Standardized measures. 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale III (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) was again 
administered and is used as a measure of participants’ receptive (hearing) vocabulary 
for Standard English. 
 
Results  
Preliminary analysis indicated there were no effects of task order or gender. 
Dual Naming Task.  
In the first request, mean performance almost reached ceiling M=95%, while in 
the second request, children picked the target 41% of the times. Which speaker made 
the second request, made no difference to the percentage of target choices (41 % 
each for Puppet 1 asking first and Puppet 2 asking first).  Intervening questions for 
familiar objects also did not make a significant difference.  Children were non-
significantly less likely to choose the target when there were intervening requests 
than when there were none (37% versus 45% of trials respectively, t(49) = 1.3 p = 
0.2). Among the non-target responses children gave, 98% of the time the distractor 
was chosen. Given the lack of differences we summed performances on the 
intervening requests and standard conditions for subsequent analysis.  
To explore whether children were more likely to pick the target because of 
the two puppets being the speakers, children within the age range of Experiment 3 
and children in the same range from Experiments 1 and 2 were examined on the Dual 
Naming Task and thus three groups of children were created (Table 3). Only these 
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children were examined from Experiments 1 and 2, because these experiments 
included a substantial number of older children whose inclusion in the present 
analysis would hinder direct comparisons. A Kruskal-Wallis test showed no 
significant differences between the three groups on the Dual Naming Task (χ2(2) = 
1.9, p = .39) and a Mann-Whitney test showed that children in Experiment 1 
performed better in the False Belief Tasks than children in Experiment 3 (U = 1245, 
p= 0.02) (Table 3). In the Dual Naming Task, whether the Puppet 1 or Puppet 2 made 
the second request made no difference to the likelihood of selecting the target – 
responses were identical for each of them. 
 
Table 3 
Mean success on main tasks in children from Experiments 1, 2 and 3 
 
 
 
The Retention Task. 
Overall, children picked the correct object 78% time. For the original 
condition, mean performance was 80% and for the IR condition it was 75%. All 
target labels were retained with equal success with mean performance ranging from 
74% to 82%. A non-parametric Friedman test of differences among repeated 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
N 65 children 59 children 50 children 
Mean Age 52.9 months 
(SD=8.8) 
50.6 months 
(SD=9.8) 
48 months 
(SD=9.8) 
Age Range 37-67 months 35-67 months 30-67 months 
VMA (Raw Score) 53.7 53.3  54  
False Belief 62% 54% 40% 
Dual Naming 49% 51% 41%a, 35%b, 43%c 
a = Dual Naming - intervening requests 
b = Dual Naming - familiar target 
c = Dual Naming - bridging information 
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measures rendered a Chi-square value of 1.04 which was non-significant (p = .79). 
When the distractor had been chosen in the Dual Naming Task, children picked the 
target object on 71% of trials; when the target had been chosen in the Dual Naming 
task, children picked the target object 87% of the time (Figure 5). As in the previous 
experiments, even children who chose the distractor in the Dual Naming task had 
correctly mapped the word to the target object.  
 
Figure 5. Choices in the Retention Task versus choices 
in the Dual Naming Task. 
 
 
The Dual Naming Task – Familiar Target. 
 
When a familiar name was used, children picked the familiar object (target) 
almost always – 92% to 98% of the time - regardless of whether it was used in the 
first or second request. When a novel name was used second, children chose the 
target 35% of the times and when used first, children chose the target 62% of the 
times. Typically, in Dual Naming Task, target is chosen at ceiling in the first request. 
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Table 4 
Children’s responses when a familiar name was used in the 1st or 2nd request. 
                                                                      Children’s responses in Dual Naming 
O
rd
er
 o
f n
am
es
 
 1st request 2nd request 
Familiar name 1st, novel 
name 2nd 
Target: 98% Target: 35%  
 Distractor: 2% Target: 100% 
Novel name 1st, Familiar 
name 2nd  
Target: 62% Target: 92%  
 Distractor: 38% Target: 100%  
 
The Retention Task – Familiar Target. 
In the Retention Task, children were always asked to pick the referent of the 
novel name, because we wanted to check if children learned the novel words. Overall, 
children picked the target object only 39% of times. All target labels were retained 
with equal success with mean performance ranging from 34% to 44%. A non-
parametric Friedman test of differences among repeated measures rendered a Chi-
square value of 1.8 which was non-significant (p = .62). 
 
Table 5 
Choices in the Retention Task in relation to the order of the names used in the requests 
of the Dual Naming Task 
  Choices in the Retention Task 
O
rd
er
 o
f n
am
es
 
in
 th
e 
D
ua
l 
N
am
in
g 
Ta
sk
  Target Distractor 
Familiar name 1st, novel 
name 2nd 
 
38% 62% 
Novel name 1st, Familiar 
name 2nd 
39% 61% 
 
 
Table 5 shows that children chose the target at similar rates when the familiar 
name was used either in the first request or the second request. Children tended to pick 
the distractor in this Retention task.  
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The Dual Naming Task – Bridging Information. 
 
In the familiar names condition, children were given two familiar names for a 
familiar object and were told that these names are related such that both apply to the 
target which was a familiar object. For example, one speaker would say “This is an 
animal” and the other would say “This is a cat, a kind of an animal”. Then the speakers 
made requests using the names each had introduced earlier. In the novel names condition, 
procedure was the same but novel names and novel target were used. 
In the familiar names condition, performance reached ceiling as expected. In 
the novel names condition, children picked the target 43% of the time in the second 
request. Percentages of target choices in the first Dual Naming Task (41%) and this 
one were similar. Thus, adding bridging information did not improve children’s 
performance. 
In relation to the role of the speaker (Speaker versus Puppet), who made the 
second request, in the familiar names condition no effect of speaker was found neither 
for the times the distractor was chosen nor the target. In the novel-names condition 
(Table 6), there was a statistically significant speaker difference; children were more 
likely to pick the target if the experimenter made the second request, χ2 = 5.2, p < .02. 
 
Table 6 
Number of choices of Distractor/Target in the Dual Naming Task – Bridging 
information versus speaker in the novel names condition 
 
 Speaker asking the 2nd request 
Experimenter Puppet2 
Distractor choices 24 33 
Target choices 28 15 
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The Retention Task – Bridging Information. 
For the familiar names condition, children picked the target in all trials except 
one.  For the novel names condition, mean performance in the Retention Task was 
76% and statistically different to chance, (t (49) = 5.7 p < .001). For the trials in 
which the distractor was chosen in this Dual Naming Task, children picked the target 
object on 61% of trials in the Retention Task, showing that even children who chose 
the distractor in this Dual Naming task had correctly mapped the word to the target 
object (Figure 6). For the trials that Target was chosen from the beginning in the 
Dual Naming Task, performance in the Retention Task reached ceiling. All target 
labels for the novel names condition were retained with equal success with mean 
performance 76%.  
 
 
 
False Belief Tasks. 
Children passed 40% of false belief trials: of 50 children, 16 children passed 
both false belief tasks, 26 children failed both tasks and 8 children passed just one of the 
tasks. Nine children failed one or both control questions in each task.   
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Figure 6. Choices in the Retention Task versus choices in the Dual 
Naming Task – Bridging information version. 
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Developmental Trajectory. 
Age did not correlate strongly with either of the main tasks (Table 7). False 
Belief Task still correlated strongly with age. However, in the case of Dual Naming 
Task versus age, there was a tendency to significance, r = .27, p = .058. Figure 7 
shows children’s improvement with age in this task. 
 
Figure 7. Mean percentage of target choices in the Dual Naming Task in 
relation to age.  
 
Comparison of the tasks. 
All three main tasks correlated strongly with performance in False Belief 
Tasks (Table 7). The relationships remained robust after partialing out age and 
verbal mental age. Retention tasks in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 also correlated with 
the False Beliefs Tasks, r = .37, p = .009; r = .37, p = .009; r = .30, p = .04 
respectively (age and verbal mental age partialed out). 
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Table 7 
Correlations between tasks 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows children’s choices in the Dual Naming Task – Familiar Target 
in relation to the number of false belief tasks they passed. As in the previous 
experiments, the majority of children who picked the target in both requests passed at 
least one false belief task (62%), while the majority of those who picked the distractor 
in the second request passed either none or only one false belief task (81%). Regarding 
those who picked the distractor first and target second, 80% of the children passed 
either none or only one false belief task. Statistical analysis showed that children who 
failed the false belief tasks were more likely to pick the distractor in the first request, r 
= .36, p = .01 (chronological and verbal mental age partialed out). As mentioned 
earlier, no child picked the distractor on both requests. 
 
 
 VMA False 
Belief 
DNT DNT – 
Familiar 
Target 
DNT – 
Bridging 
information 
Age 
 
.79** .74** .27 .25 .20 
VMA 
 
___ .69** .33* .04 .30* 
False Belief 
 
 ___ .46** .43** .35* 
DNT 
 
 .36* ___ .38** .56** 
DNT – 
Familiar 
Target 
 .36* .32* ___ .52** 
DNT – 
Bridging 
information 
 .26 .51** .48** ___ 
Note: Correlations after partialing out age and verbal mental age are presented below the diagonal. 
*     p < 0.05. 
**   p < 0.001. 
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Table 8  
Children’s choices in the first and second request of the Dual Naming Task – Familiar Target 
in relation to the number of false belief tasks passed 
                                              Number of False Belief Tasks passed 
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–  
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t  0 1 2 
Target – Target 38% 14% 48% 
Target – Distractor 65% 16% 19% 
Distractor – Target 60% 20% 20% 
Distractor - Distractor 0 0 0 
 
 
Comparison of the Dual Naming Tasks within and between experiments. 
Looking at the proportion of target choices across the three DNT’s within this 
experiment (Table 3), percentages are similar, as the target was chosen 41% of the 
time in the Dual Naming Task, 35% of the times in the “familiar target” version of 
the DNT and 43% of the times in the “bridging information” version of DNT. Note 
that for the “familiar target” DNT, the overall percentage of target choices in the 
second request was higher compared to the other experiments – 65% approximately. 
This occurred, because children picked the target when the familiar name was used 
regardless of position. Thus, for the purposes of the present comparison, I only used 
the performance when the familiar name was used in the first request, as the opposite 
order created a ceiling effect that might impede conclusions if included.  
Between experiment 1, 2 and 3, the proportion of target choices across the 
Dual Naming tasks were similar – 49% for Experiment 1, 51% for Experiment 2 and 
around 40% for Experiment 3. Children in Experiment 3 were slightly younger, so 
this can explain the small differences. Nevertheless, the pragmatic modifications that 
took place in Experiment 3 did not improve children’s performance. 
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Discussion  
The addition of intervening requests and the use of two puppets in the Dual 
Naming Task did not change 3- and 4-year-olds’ performance; younger children still 
failed to apply two names to one object. Data from our modified task were no 
different to those of the prior two experiments, further suggesting that children’s 
choice of the distractor previously was not due to the pragmatics of the experimental 
procedure. Further, the strong relationship between the Dual Naming Task and False 
Belief Task was replicated again and children again demonstrated retention of the 
names. 
In the Dual Naming Task – Familiar Target, children almost always picked 
the target in the requests when the familiar name was used. However, when the novel 
name was used, children picked the target less than half of the time when that was 
used in the second request and more than just half of the time when that was used in 
the first request. This is because young children are less likely to accept a novel 
name for the same familiar target, as a well-established word is likely to supplant a 
weakly-learned word regardless of when it is introduced into the conversation. As 
expected there was a strong correlation with performance on the False Belief Tasks; 
children who cannot not pass the false belief tasks yet, are very likely to implicitly 
name familiar objects, less so with unfamiliar ones with recently taught names. 
In the Dual Naming Task – Bridging information, children’s overall 
performance (43% success) was similar to the first Dual Naming task (41%) of this 
experiment, indicating that adding bridging information did not make any difference 
in children’s performance. This is problematic for the socio-pragmatic account, as it 
would predict that children would perform better thanks to the additional information 
indicating clearly the speaker’s referential intent. However, this was not the case and 
 66 
children’s performance was again strongly associated with on their success in the 
false belief tasks confirming in this way the general pattern found throughout the 
previous experiments. 
Regarding the Retention Tasks, target choices when distractor was chosen in 
the Dual Naming Tasks were similar for the Dual Naming Task and the Dual 
Naming Task – Bridging information (71% and 61% respectively). In the Dual 
Naming Task – Familiar Target, overall target choices - i.e. choices of the familiar 
target - were particularly low (39%), meaning children did not learn the names that 
well.  However, this finding is not surprising, as this Retention Task differed from 
the others on the basis that children were presented with a familiar object (familiar 
target) and a novel object (distractor) instead of two novel objects. This was done to 
check if children learned the names. Thus, in this retention task, children came across 
a situation resembling the standard disambiguation; they were presented with a novel 
and a familiar object and were asked for the referent of the novel name. Typically, in 
disambiguation children pick the novel object around 80% of the times. In this case, 
children picked the novel object around 62% of the times. This percentage is slightly 
lower than the typical performance, as the novel name was not entirely novel; for the 
remaining 38% of the cases, children still recognized the novel name as having been 
assigned to the target during the Dual naming procedure and thus, they picked the 
familiar target in the Retention Task. As expected, this behaviour correlated with 
success in the False Belief Tasks.  
Overall, this experiment showed that having two puppets as speakers and 
adding intervening requests did not make any difference in children’s performance in 
the dual naming tasks. Adding bridging information also did not improve target 
choices. In addition, weaker-learned names are likely to be replaced by familiar ones, 
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but not vice versa. But most importantly, this experiment showed that performances 
on the dual naming tasks still correlated strongly with success in the False Belief 
Tasks regardless of the pragmatic manipulations that had been added making the 
target look like the most pragmatically salient choice.   
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Bilingual Analysis Experiments 1- 3 
In each experiment, a minority of participants were reported by teachers to be 
bilingual; having at least one parent who spoke a language other than English (Expt. 1: 
N=10; Expt. 2: N=15; Expt. 3: N=11).  To examine the potential differences in the 
performance of monolingual and bilingual children, I matched each bilingual child 
from all three experiments (N=36) with two monolingual comparison participants from 
the same experiment; the closest in chronological age and the closest in VMA (Table 
9). Dual Naming and False Belief performances were similar across experiments.  
Because the number of trials differed between experiments I used percentages of 
correct responses for this analysis. Comparisons were drawn between the main tasks, 
that is Dual Naming Task and the False Belief Tasks, as these were the common tasks 
among the three experiments. For the two remaining tasks in Experiment 3, i.e. the 
Dual Naming Task – Familiar Target and the Dual Naming Task – Bridging 
Information, preliminary analysis showed that bilingual children did not perform 
differently than monolinguals - U=210, p=.91; U=142, p=.07 respectively -. In the 
latter, there was a tendency towards statistical significance with monolinguals being 
better than bilinguals (mean ranks = 27.4 and 18.9 respectively). Since the number of 
bilinguals in E3 was small, performance differences on these tasks were not analysed 
further. 
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Table 9 
 Mean success on main tasks in bilingual and monolingual children. 
 
Kruskal-Wallis tests showed no significant differences between the three groups 
on the Dual Naming Task, χ2(2) = 0.2, p = .93, or the False Belief task, χ2(2) = 1.7, p = 
.42.  Performance on the Dual Naming Task correlated strongly with false belief 
understanding for all three groups: bilingual, r= 0.65, p < .001; age-matched, 
monolingual r= 0.539, p = .001; VMA-matched monolingual, r= 0.43, p = .010, and 
remained so when controlling for age and VMA (bilingual, r= 0.46, p = .007; age-
matched, monolingual r= 0.535, p = .001; VMA-matched monolingual, r= 0.41, p = .015.  
Thus, bilingual status of children does not appear to have altered either the level 
of performance or the pattern of relationships between the main tasks. However, 
knowledge about bilingual status of the children in 1 to 3 was minimal. In literature about 
mutual exclusivity, there is a consistent assumption that bilingual referent selection is 
different, even if the data don’t much show this. Thus, in Experiment 4, I decided to 
examine bilingual children further. I also wanted to test this population on the Alternative 
Naming Task, since data is limited. 
 Bilinguals Monolinguals / 
Age-matched 
Monolinguals / 
VMA matched 
Age 53 months (SD=10.1) 53 months (SD=10.2) 50 months (SD=12.0) 
Age Range 30-71 months 30-71 months 32-76 months 
VMA 54 months (SD=16.5) 59 months (SD=16.6) 53 months (SD=15.8) 
False Belief 54.1% 63.9% 48.6% 
Dual Naming 50.7% 47.9% 47.9% 
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Introduction II - Bilingual children 
Bilingualism has frequently been considered in the mutual exclusivity 
literature. As bilingual children are exposed to more than one language, they gain early 
experience of objects having two names, where these names come from different 
languages. Given this fact, there should be the assumption that bilingual or trilingual 
children are more flexible when it comes to accepting and using two words for the 
same object. If this is true, it might be due to their metalinguistic awareness being 
more advanced or because bilingual children might follow a different developmental 
trajectory. Research around disambiguation in infancy tends to be slightly inconsistent, 
as in some studies, bilingual infants show slightly less disambiguation than 
monolinguals, others reveal similar performance between the two language groups and 
some show that infants show no disambiguation at all. However, in the age between 3 
and 5 years, research is more consistent, showing that bilingualism does not make a 
difference in the hypothetical mutual exclusivity bias. Here, I review previous data. 
Disambiguation studies 
Lewis, Cristiano, Lake, Kwan and Frank (2019) examined the ME bias in 
relation to children’s development and experience. Initially, they did a large 
metanalysis which showed that being monolingual or bilingual did not affect 
disambiguation. Further, their experiments showed that children with larger 
vocabularies tend to disambiguate more and that greater experience with the familiar 
word results in stronger disambiguation. Although this metanalysis is particularly 
recent and covers the main body of the current research in disambiguation, I also 
present the most representative earlier studies that can be discussed in terms of 
methodology.  
 71 
As mentioned earlier in the literature review, Halberda (2003) showed that 
children’s looking time at the novel objects increased in the presence of a familiar 
object when listening to a novel name, but this was not the case for children younger 
than 17 months. However, no such phenomenon was found in 17- to 20-month 
bilinguals when tested on a very similar procedure by Houston-Price, Caloghiris and 
Raviglione (2010). Monolingual children were found to disambiguate, while bilinguals 
were not. The researchers’ explanation was that bilinguals did not disambiguate as 
they are more used to looking to familiar and not only novel objects when they hear a 
novel word.  
Byers-Heinlein and Werker (2009) also ran a similar procedure and found 
differences in three different language groups between the ages of 17-18 months. 
When a novel object was presented with a novel word, monolinguals showed a 
disambiguation effect, bilinguals a marginally significant effect, and trilinguals no 
effect. The researchers interpreted their results on the basis that knowledge of the 
name of the familiar object is what defines performance rather than knowledge about 
the novel object. Multilingual children might disambiguate less, as they might not be 
aware of the names of the familiar object in all languages they speak, thus they 
consider the familiar object as a possible referent. In 2013, they ran a study using the 
same procedure, replicated their (and Halberda’s, 2003) findings and further found that 
the bilinguals who disambiguated less were those who knew more translation 
equivalents. Infants who knew less translation equivalents showed disambiguation in 
the same rate as same-aged monolinguals do. 
By measuring looking times, Bion, Borovsky and Fernald (2012) used the 
standard disambiguation paradigm and found that 18-month-old bilingual children did 
not disambiguate as reliably as 24- and 30-month-olds. They also examined retention 
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of the novel word mappings, which they found to be poor, as 18- and 24-month-olds 
did not retain the names for the novel objects and 30-month-olds showed some faint 
signs of retention. However, as mentioned earlier, scoring criteria were different to 
previous studies (e.g. Byers-Heinlein & Werker, 2009; Halberda, 2003); they did not 
take into account the looking baseline. The authors note that that if they do so, they get 
a marginally significant effect, indicating similar findings to previous studies. 
In their eye-tracking study, Kalashnikova, Escudero and Kidd (2018) tested 
children on disambiguation and retention at 18 months of age (Experiment 1) and a 
subgroup of them was tested again on retention at 24 months (Experiment 2). 
Measuring fixation times, they found no differences in disambiguation at 18 and 24 
months and also low retention levels in bilinguals. 
Au and Glusman (1990), the first to examine the ME bias in bilingual 
participants, tested monolingual and bilingual children between the ages of 4 and 6 
years. After providing children with two novel words for the same object, they found 
no differences in disambiguation between the two groups. Monolingual children 
showed disambiguation within their language and avoided applying two different 
names on the same object. However, they assigned names randomly if told that a novel 
word would be in a foreign language and they accepted word overlap if they were 
directly asked whether a previously named object could have another name in the 
other language. The researchers proposed that clear task instructions bring about equal 
performance in monolingual and bilingual children of this age.  
Testing bilinguals and monolinguals of similar age, Davidson, Jergovic, Imami 
and Theodos (1997) tested 3- to 4-year-olds and 5- to 6-year-olds and found no 
significant differences within the younger groups. By an unusual division of younger 
children into halves, they found that half of the younger bilinguals and all younger 
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monolinguals avoided lexical overlap significantly above chance (69% and 65% of 
trials). The other half of the younger bilinguals were close to chance (60%), too. Older 
monolinguals’ disambiguation performance reached ceiling (92%) and was reported 
significantly more often compared to older bilinguals (69%). Thus, bilingual children 
from the age of three did disambiguate, but the effect did not increase at the same rate 
as in monolingual children; having to learn two language has a cost. 
Davidson and Tell (2005) found that, compared to monolingual 3- to 4-year-
olds, 5- to 6 years old bilinguals were slightly less likely to avoid lexical overlap. They 
used a procedure first introduced by Markman and Wachtel (1988) according to 
which, children were required to decide whether a novel name could be assigned to a 
whole object or just a salient part of it. In that study, it was found that children would 
look for a part of the object when hearing a second label rather than accept it as an 
alternative name. Davidson and Tell (2005) found that bilingual children did accept 
lexical overlap for a whole object. In contrast, monolingual children did not accept 
both names as much. Three and 4-year-old monolinguals picked a part of a familiar 
object as referent at ceiling (90% of the times) and bilinguals performed so in 82% of 
the times.  
Diesendruck (2005, Expt. 3) reported no disambiguation effect in 12 bilingual 
pre-schoolers in a Hebrew-only when the puppet speaker was absent during the 
introduction of the first name. The author interpreted this finding by underlining the 
importance of speaker knowledge in children’s interpretation of referential intent. If 
bilingual children know that a speaker speaks more than one language they show less 
disambiguation.  
Merriman and Kutlesic (1993) tested even older children between the ages of 5 
and 8 on the correction effect. Bilingual and monolingual children were first taught a 
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novel name for a novel object. Then, they were presented with an array of objects and 
were asked to help a puppet choose more referents of this label. These objects were 
similar and either shared a special feature or not. After that, a new puppet speaking 
either the child’s or a foreign language, taught children another novel name for one of 
the objects. Children were then asked to choose all referents of the second novel name. 
After objects were put back, the experimenter reminded children of the first label and 
asked them to choose the corresponding objects. Within language, older children – 
equally bilinguals and monolinguals - were significantly more likely to correct the first 
name and avoid objects with corrected names in the last phase. Across languages, 
bilingual children were more likely to accept lexical overlap. The authors attributed 
this behaviour to their constant exposure to multiple labels across languages. 
Dual Naming studies 
The standard disambiguation task and our Dual Naming task differ in one 
important aspect; the Dual Naming Task makes it clear that the referent of each word 
is the same. What follows now is a review of recent studies examining bilingual 
differences while using procedures similar to the Dual Naming Task. 
Frank and Poulin-Dubois (2002) gave monolingual and bilingual children aged 
26-28 months and 34-36 months a version of Savage and Au’s task. They also had an 
additional condition where Experimenter 1 administered the task in the child’s 
dominant language and Experimenter 2 did so in the child’s non-dominant language. 
In the test phase, each experimenter asked for the target using the name each had 
introduced previously. Thus, children received two requests in English (one for the 
familiar object and one for the target) and two requests in French (one for the 
remaining familiar object and one for the target). In the monolingual condition, 
bilinguals avoided lexical overlap as much as monolinguals (39% at 27 months, 58% 
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at 35 months), but also showed an equivalent behaviour across languages (38% and 
57%, respectively). Thus, no differences were found between the two populations.  
Kalashnikova, Mattock and Monaghan (2015) examined bilingual and 
monolingual 3- to 5-year-olds. Their procedure included a disambiguation task and a 
dual naming task. All children performed above chance in both tasks. Regarding 
differences between language groups, results showed that among younger children, 
performances were roughly equal. In older children however, monolinguals were 
slightly better in the exclusivity condition, while bilinguals were slightly better in the 
overlap.  
Overall, the studies using measures similar to the Dual Naming Task have 
shown equal performances between monolingual and bilingual children. Experiments 
1 to 3 of this thesis have already shown a strong relationship between theory of mind 
and flexible use of co-referential words. Assuming that bilingual children might 
develop false belief understanding slightly earlier than monolingual children, they are 
also expected to pass tasks requiring lexical overlap earlier, too.  
Theory of mind development 
Tare and Gelman (2010) had earlier examined children’s ability to differentiate 
between languages alongside their meta-linguistic awareness and theory of mind 
development. Three- to 4-year-old children were tested on various language tasks and 
metacognitive measures. They were presented with objects and were asked to name 
them. This procedure was run one time in English and one time in Marathi with the 
order being counterbalanced. Children’s metalinguistic awareness was tested by a 
language check on how experimenters would name certain objects depending on their 
language. Spontaneous use of each language during play time was also recorded. Both 
groups were using mostly the speaker’s language and their ability to switch languages 
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was significantly associated with their metalinguistic awareness. There was also a 
strong correlation between switching and theory of mind, even after partialing out 
chronological age. The researchers concluded that theory of mind underlies the ability 
to reflect on the speaker’s language abilities. They further suggested that 
metalinguistic awareness is associated closely to theory of mind development, 
children’s responsiveness to a language was predicted by metalinguistic abilities, but 
only when this was connected with metacognitive ability. 
Theory of mind is reported to develop slightly earlier in bilinguals (Kovács, 
2009; Nguyen & Astington, 2014). In a longitudinal study, Diaz and Farrar (2018) 
examined whether metalinguistic awareness underlies the small bilingual advantage. 
They tested 38- to 66-month-olds on a variety of tasks measuring theory of mind, 
language, memory, executive function - mainly inhibitory control and cognitive 
flexibility – and metalinguistic awareness which included the judgment version of the 
Alternative Naming Task (Doherty & Perner, 1998). Children were tested again in one 
year’s time. At time 1, bilinguals outperformed monolinguals in false belief 
understanding after controlling for verbal mental age. Bilinguals were also stronger in 
the metalinguistic awareness composite and the executive function composite. In time 
2, false belief performance in bilinguals was predicted only by metalinguistic 
awareness and this relationship was mainly driven by the association between 
performances on alternative naming and false belief tasks. Thus, it can be concluded 
that bilingual children might eventually be able to demonstrate better theory of mind 
performance compared to monolingual children, as a result of better metalinguistic 
awareness. In turn, better metalinguistic awareness may result from their language 
history that differs substantially to monolinguals. 
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Perspectival account’s predictions 
As can be concluded, bilingual research in infancy varies between findings 
suggesting that bilingual infants show slightly less disambiguation than monolinguals, 
findings suggesting similar performance between the two language groups and 
findings that infants show no disambiguation at all. However, Lewis and colleagues 
(2019) provide evidence for no difference at any age. In relation to the 3- to 5-year-old 
age range I examine in this thesis, most of the studies clearly show equal 
disambiguation between monolinguals and bilinguals, indicating that language status 
does not have an effect in disambiguation. Results in school-age children are mixed 
again, but there seems to be a tendency towards no differences in development 
between the two groups. Regarding differences in theory of mind, bilingual children 
seem to show a later advantage which is closely related to early metalinguistic 
awareness. Also, Diaz and Farrar’s (2018) study clearly showed that common factors 
in alternative naming and theory of mind are responsible for bilingual’s early 
metalinguistic awareness. 
In relation to language status, the perspectival account predicts that both 
monolinguals and bilinguals will avoid lexical overlap equally and success for both 
would depend on success in theory of mind tasks. The same should apply in the case 
of the Dual Naming Task, too. Both monolingual and bilingual preschool children 
should avoid picking the target in the second request until they pass the false belief 
task. Since there is evidence that bilingual children might develop perspectival 
understanding slightly earlier than monolinguals, bilingual children might be expected 
to start succeeding the Dual Naming Task earlier, too. However, it should be noted 
that this success should be in connection with success in theory of mind tasks.  
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These predictions will be tested in the following experiment. In this fourth 
experiment, Greek- English bilingual and English monolingual children will be tested 
on the Dual Naming Task, plus the Retention Task, and two False Belief Tasks. 
Additionally, both groups will be tested on the Alternative Naming Task by Doherty 
and Perner (1998) which examines children’s flexibility in producing two known 
names for the same thing. As discussed in the Introduction, this task has also been 
found to correlate strongly with the False Belief Task. The combination of all these 
tasks is bilinguals is novel. 
Also, in this experiment we introduced another version of the Alternative 
Naming Task; the Alternative Naming task - Across Languages version. This task is 
almost identical to the standard Alternative Naming Task, with the difference that 
children were required to produce two names – one from each language - for the same 
thing.  Administering the Alternative Naming Task across languages is novel. Tare 
and Gelman (2010) tested children’s ability to name the same object in different 
languages. However, they did this in two sessions, one for English and one for 
Marathi. In contrast, a defining feature of the Alternative Naming Task is that children 
are required to produce alternative names consecutively, within one session.  
The perspectival account would predict that switching between two languages 
in a single session requires the ability to distinguish between words and their referents, 
part of the ability to understand perspective. A proviso comes from the fact that 
children can clearly tailor their language to the typical contexts in which they use them 
(e.g., at home, at school, with mummy, or with daddy).  This is presumed to be 
exogenous; children’s language behaviour being determined by context. However, 
there may be context cues within the experimental procedure, given it took place in an 
English school, and explicitly referred to languages by their context of typical use (‘at 
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home’, ‘at school’; see below).  Children may also have developed strategies to help 
them switch languages that do not require perspectival understanding.  Thus, 
performance on this task may not conform to the strict predictions of the perspectival 
account, as other factors may play a role. 
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Experiment 4 – Bilingual Children 
Method 
Participants. 
Eighty-six typically developing children participated, from four English schools 
in Athens, Greece with a primarily upper-class intake and one school in Norwich, UK 
with a primarily middle-class intake. Forty-five children were Greek-English bilinguals 
and this group comprised 18 3-year-olds (12 girls; M= 41.8 months; age range = 37-46 
months), 12 4-year-olds (7 girls; M= 53.2 months; age range = 48-57 months) and 15 5-
year-olds (9 girls; M= 63.9 months; age range = 60-69 months). According to the 
parents’ reports, children were considered to have a weekly exposure to English at a 
mean rate of 16% and to Greek at a mean rate of 84%. Language exposure data were 
provided for 34 of the bilingual children. Forty-one children were English monolinguals 
and this group comprised 10 3-year-olds (8 girls; M= 42.2 months; age range = 39-45 
months), 16 4-year-olds (6 girls; M= 54.1 months; age range = 48-58 months) and 15 5-
year-olds (8 girls; M= 64.1 months; age range = 60-68 months).  
Design. 
There were three sessions of at most 15 minutes. Bilingual children completed 
the Dual Naming Task, the Retention Task, the Alternative Naming Task (ANT), the 
Alternative Naming Task - Across Languages version and two False Belief Tasks. 
Monolingual children were tested on all the above except Alternative Naming Task – 
Across Languages version. The order of the main tasks was counterbalanced with the 
constraint that for bilingual children, the Alternative Naming Task was administered 
always in the first session and Alternative Naming Task – Across Languages version 
always in the second session. This was done to avoid a carry-over effect of children 
being tempted to produce words of the other language in the Alternative Naming Task 
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if that was administered second. Children received the Retention Task right after the 
Dual Naming Task. The British Picture Vocabulary Scale III (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) was 
administered last. The Language Exposure Assessment Tool was completed by the 
parents.  
Stimuli.  
Eight unusual toys/household objects, 16 familiar objects and 10 pictures 
depicting familiar objects were used (Appendix E). 
Labels. 
The novel words (bubit, welne, tachte, puhne, blicket, ente, boskot, cheedor) 
were taken from Gollek (2013). The familiar word-pairs for Alternative Naming Task 
I were dog-animal, carrot-vegetable, owl-bird, milk-drink and apple-fruit. For the 
Alternative Naming Task II, 6 English words were used (flower, fish, plate, ice-cream, 
tree, house) and 6 Greek words used each being a direct translation to each of the 
English words (λουλούδι, ψάρι, πιάτο, παγωτό, δέντρο, σπίτι).  
Other Materials. 
 A hand-puppet was used as a second speaker. A small cardboard model was 
used as the puppet’s house. Two Playmobile® figures, a box, a tiny cupboard and a 
small ball were used for the False Belief Task Ι and False Belief Task II was presented 
on a portable computer with Microsoft Power-point.  
Procedure. 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. The experimenter and the 
child were sitting at a small table and the child was always sitting opposite the 
experimenter. At the beginning of the first session, the experimenter initiated small 
talk to establish rapport. The tasks were administered in English with the exception of 
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the Alternative Naming Task – Across Languages version, where half of the names 
were requested in Greek. 
Dual Naming Task.  
The procedure was identical to Experiments 1 and 2. 
Retention Task. 
The procedure was identical to Experiments 1 and 2. 
Alternative Naming Task. 
Vocabulary check. Four sheets of paper were presented individually, each 
displaying six pictures. The child was asked to point to each experimental item twice on 
different sheets: once under the basic label (e.g., ‘‘Show me the dog”) and once under 
the superordinate label (‘‘Show me the animal”).  
Alternative Naming phase. The child was presented with an individual picture 
and told, ‘‘Now, here are some more pictures. Each picture has two names. I am going 
to tell you one name for it, and you can then tell me another name for it. Let’s try that. 
This is fruit. What else is it?”. If a child just repeated the experimenter’s word, the 
experimenter would say “Well, this is what I have said… Any other word for fruit?”.  
After this practice trial, the procedure continued with four pictures (dog, vegetable, owl, 
drink) and then a second time using the alternative labels (animal, carrot, bird, milk). 
The child was asked to provide both superordinate and basic labels to pass a particular 
item. The apple-fruit item was used as a familiarisation trial.  
Alternative Naming Task – Across languages version. 
The procedure was the same as the English version of the Alternative Naming 
Task (please see above) with the difference that children were asked to 
produce/recognize only basic labels and half of the labels were in Greek. The pairs used 
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were: house-σπίτι, tree-δέντρο, ice-cream-παγωτό, fish-ψάρι, plate-πιάτο, flower-
λουλούδι. In the Vocabulary check, half of the children were tested on the Greek words 
first in Greek and half of the children were tested on the English words first (e.g. “Show 
me the fish”, then “Δείξε μου το ψάρι” or the other way around). In the Alternative 
Naming Phase, in one trial the English name was requested first and in the other trial 
the Greek name was requested first in a counterbalanced order. Older children were 
already familiarized with the distinction between the English and Greek language, so 
the questions were delivered as following: “Now, here are some more pictures. Each 
picture has two names; one in Greek and one in English. I am going to tell you one name 
for it in one language, and then you can then tell me the other name for it in the other 
language. Let’s try that. This is house. How do we call that in Greek?”. The first two 
items were used as familiarisation trials. For younger children who might not be able to 
make this distinction just yet, questions were delivered as following: “Now, here are 
some more pictures. Each picture has two names; one in Greek, which is how we speak 
at home and one in English which is how we speak at school. I am going to tell you one 
name for it in one way, and then you can then tell me the other name for it in the other 
way. Let’s try that. This is fish. How do we call that at home?” or “This is ψάρι. How 
do we call that at school?”. 
False Belief Tasks. 
False Belief Tasks were identical as in Experiments 1-3. 
Standardized measures. 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale III (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) was again 
administered and is used as a measure of participants’ receptive (hearing) vocabulary 
for Standard English. 
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Language Exposure Assessment Tool (LEAT). 
This is a parent-report scoring tool that has been used in previous studies to 
measure young children’s language exposure (De Anda, Bosch, Poulin-Dubois, Zesiger 
& Friend, 2016). It aims to record who communicates with the child on a weekly basis, 
what languages are spoken to the child, and for how long. The data are entered into an 
electronic form, and an estimate of the proportion of time that the child is exposed to 
each language is calculated. 
 
Results 
Preliminary analysis indicated there were no effects of task order or gender. 
Bilinguals 
Dual Naming Task. 
All children selected the target object on the first request in the familiar words 
condition. In the second request, performance on the familiar names condition almost 
reached ceiling, with only 4 children choosing the distractor on a single trial. In the 
novel words condition, children succeeded 33% of the time. 43 out of 45 children 
chose the target as the referent of the first request on all four trials, with two children 
each picking a distractor on three trials. For the second request, 36% of the children 
picked the target in no trial, 18% in 1 trial, 29% in 2 trials and 13% in 3 trials. Only 
4% of the children chose the target all times (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8. Percentage of children who succeeded in one, two, three, 
four trials or in no trial in the 2nd request of the Dual Naming Task – 
novel words condition. 
 
Whether the experimenter or puppet made the second request made no statistical 
difference to which object was selected (see Table 10). 
Table 10  
Overall number of choices of Distractor/Target in the Dual Naming Task 
versus speaker 
 Speaker asking the 2nd request 
Experimenter Puppet 
Distractor choices 50 62 
Target choices 31 29 
 
Retention Task. 
Children picked the target object on 73% of times. All target labels were 
retained with equal success with mean performance ranging from 67% to 78%. A 
non-parametric Friedman test of differences among repeated measures rendered a 
Chi-square value of 4.15 which was non-significant (p = .24). When children had 
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chosen the distractor in the Dual Naming Task, they picked the target object on 66% 
of trials, meaning even children who chose the distractor in the Dual Naming task 
had correctly mapped the word to the target object (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9. Choices in the Retention Task versus choices in 
the Dual Naming Task. 
 
Alternative Naming Task.  
Mean performance on the vocabulary check reached ceiling with 98%. In the 
alternative naming phase, children were considered to succeed on a given trial, if they 
provided both names for an item. Also, the training trial used to familiarise children 
with the task is not included in the analysis. Children succeed 50% of the trials. From 
this total performance, mean performance when children were asked to provide the 
basic term (e.g. dog) was much higher 93% compared to when the superordinate term 
(e.g. animal) was required 53%. This difference was statistically significant, t(43)= 7.1, 
p < .001. Figure 10 shows the percentage of children who succeeded in one, two, three, 
four trials or in no trial in Alternative Naming Task. 
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Figure 10. Percentage of children who succeeded in one, two, 
three, four trials or in no trial in Alternative Naming Task. 
 
 
Alternative Naming Task – Across Languages.  
 
Mean performance on the vocabulary check was with ceiling performance for 
Greek words – 100%- and 90% for English words. In the alternative naming phase, 
children were considered to succeed on a given trial, if they provided both names for an 
item. Also, the two training trials used to familiarise children with the task are not 
included in the analysis. Children succeeded in 78% of the trials on average with a mean 
of 93% for Greek words and 80% for English words. This difference was statistically 
significant, t(43)= 3.1, p = .004.  Figure 11 shows that the majority of the children (64%) 
provided both names for all 4 items. 
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Figure 11. Percentage of children who succeeded in one, two, three, 
four trials or in no trial in Alternative Naming Task. 
 
 
False Belief Tasks. 
Children passed 55% of false belief tasks: of 45 children 22 children passed both 
false belief tasks, 4 children passed only 1 false belief task and 19 children failed both 
tasks. Five children failed one or both control questions on the first false belief task and 
one child failed one control question on the second false belief task. Performance in the 
False Belief Task was strongly correlated with age (Table 11). 
Developmental Trajectory. 
 The False Belief Tasks and the two Alternative Naming Tasks correlated strongly 
with chronological age and verbal mental age (see Table 11). For further analysis, children 
were split in three age groups: 3-year-olds (N= 18), 4-year-olds (N= 12) and 5-year-olds 
(N= 15). In the Alternative Naming Task, 5-year-olds and 4-year-olds performed 
significantly better than 3-year-olds; t(30)= 4.83, p < .001 and t(27)= 3.03, p = .005 
respectively. There was no difference in performance between 5-olds and 4-year-olds; 
t(25)= 1.34, p = .19. With regard to the cross-language version of the Alternative Naming  
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Task there was a strong correlation with age, too. Since performance reached 
ceiling, though, correlations should be treated with caution. Developmental trajectory for 
both tasks is depicted in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean percentage of target choices in the Alternative Naming 
Task and the Alternative Naming Task – Cross language version in relation 
to age. 
 
 
Comparison of the tasks. 
 
Both the ANT and the Cross-language ANT correlated strongly with 
performance in False Belief Tasks (Table 11). The Alternative Naming Task correlated 
with false belief understanding even when age and verbal mental age were partialed out. 
Also, the two Alternative Naming Tasks correlated strongly with each other even after 
age and verbal mental age were partialed out. 
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Table 11 
Correlations between tasks in bilingual children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monolinguals. 
 
The Dual Naming Task. 
 
For monolingual children, performance on the familiar names condition almost 
reached ceiling, with only 2 children choosing the distractor on a single trial. In the 
novel words condition, 99% of the children chose the target as the referent of the first 
request on all four trials, with one child picking the distractor on a single trial. For the 
second request, monolingual children succeeded 60% of the trials. More than half of 
the children (58%) picked the target in either 3 or all four trials.  Performance for one, 
two or none of the trials was spread as shown in Figure 13. 
 BPVS False   
Belief  
  Dual    
Naming  
   ANT  ANT  
Cross-
language 
Age .76** .53** .04 .62** .59** 
BPVS   _ .44* .10 .44** .60** 
False Belief     _ .10 .47** .43** 
Dual Naming   .16   _ .08 .10 
ANT  .35* .10   _ .48** 
ANT Cross-language  .25 .18 .30*   _ 
Retention  .18 .35* .34*  28 
Note: Correlations after partialing out age and verbal mental age are presented below the diagonal. 
*   p < 0.05. 
** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 13. Percentage of monolingual who succeeded in one, two, 
three, four trials or in no trial in the 2nd request of the Dual 
Naming Task. 
 
Whether the Puppet 1 or Puppet 2 made the second request made no difference 
to the likelihood of selecting the target – responses were identical for each of them. 
 
The Retention Task. 
The target object was the one for which a novel name had been taught in the Dual 
Naming task. Overall, children picked the target object on 82% of times. All target 
labels were retained with equal success with mean performance ranging from 76% to 
88%. A non-parametric Friedman test of differences among repeated measures rendered 
a Chi-square value of 4.9 which was non-significant (p = .18). When children had 
chosen the distractor in the Dual Naming Task, they picked the target object on 66% of 
trials, meaning even children who chose the distractor in the Dual Naming task had 
correctly mapped the word to the target object (Figure 14).  
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Figure 14. Choices in the Retention Task versus choices 
in the Dual Naming Task in monolingual children. 
 
 
Alternative Naming Task. 
 
Mean performance on the vocabulary check reached ceiling with 100% success. 
In the alternative naming phase, children were considered to succeed on a given trial, if 
they provided both names for an item. Also, the training trials used to familiarise children 
with the task is not included in the analysis. Children succeed in 60% of the trials. From 
this total performance, mean performance when children were asked to provide the basic 
term (e.g. dog) was much higher - 93% - compared to when the superordinate term (e.g. 
animal) was required 60%. This difference was statistically significant, t(40)= -5.5, p < 
.001. More than half of the monolingual children (62%) picked the target in either 3 or all 
four trials (Figure 15).  
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Figure 15. Percentage of monolingual children who succeeded 
in one, two, three, four trials or in no trial in Alternative 
Naming Task. 
 
 
False Belief Tasks. 
Children passed 65% of false belief tasks: 26 children passed both false belief 
tasks, 3 children passed only 1 false belief task and 12 children failed both tasks. Three 
children failed one or both control questions on the first false belief task and two children 
failed one control question on the second false belief task.  
Developmental trajectory. 
All tasks, apart from the Dual Naming Task, correlated strongly with 
chronological age and verbal mental age (see Table 12).  
Comparison of the tasks. 
 
All tasks correlated strongly with performance in False Belief Tasks (Table 12), 
indicating that monolingual children are more likely to succeed in these tasks and this 
correlation remained strong even after partialing out age and verbal mental age.  
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Table 12 
Correlations between tasks in monolingual children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Comparisons between bilinguals and monolinguals. 
In the Dual Naming Task, monolinguals performed significantly better than 
bilinguals; t(84)= -3.9, p < .001 (Table 13). Both language groups performed similarly 
in the Alternative Naming Task and the False Belief Tasks - t(83)= -1.2, p = .23 and U = 
784, p = .195 respectively -  and correlations between these tasks was significantly 
strong in both groups. In Retention, no differences were found between monolinguals 
and bilinguals, t(84)= -1.6, p = .11. Analysis showed that monolinguals performed 
better than bilinguals on the BPVS and this difference was statistically significant, 
t(84)= 7.5, p = .02 (mean raw score=47 for bilinguals; mean raw score=54 for 
monolinguals).  
 
Table 13 
 Mean success in the main tasks among the two language groups 
 
 
 
 BPVS False 
Belief 
Dual 
Naming 
ANT Retention 
Age .75** .37* .25 .48** .31* 
BPVS _ .41* .40* .40* .39* 
False Belief   _ .41* .66** .51* 
Dual Naming   .32* _ .59**  .61** 
ANT  .59** .56** _ .48* 
Retention   .42* .54** .39* _ 
 Bilinguals Monolinguals 
Dual Naming Task 33% 60% 
Alternative Naming Task 50% 60% 
False Belief Task 55% 65% 
Retention Task 73% 82% 
Note: Correlations after partialing out age and verbal mental age are presented below the diagonal. 
*   p < 0.05. 
** p < 0.001. 
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Discussion  
Experiment 4 tested bilingual children and compared their performance to 
monolingual children. The perspectival account predicted that that both monolinguals 
and bilinguals will avoid lexical overlap equally and success for both would associate 
with success in theory of mind tasks. This prediction was confirmed, as success in 
referent selection tasks, such as the Alternative Naming Task, was associated with 
false belief understanding and was independent of language status. That was not the 
case for the Dual Naming Task, though, where bilinguals’ performance was low. Also, 
when tested across languages, bilingual children produced alternative names with 
relevant ease.  
Bilinguals’ performance in the Dual Naming Task was lower compared to our 
previous experiments; bilingual children succeeded 33% of the time, while in 
Experiments 1 to 3, success rates ranged between 49-51%. A possible reason for that 
is arguably children’s lack of confidence regarding the language they were tested in. In 
particular, there were cases that this was explicitly expressed without prompting using 
statements such as “I ‘m not that good at English, so I might not do well in the 
games”. The nature of the statements led to the speculation that children’s 
performance might have indeed been affected by the degree they believed they will 
perform well on the task. Children encounter this difficulty with the Dual Naming 
Task in particular, as this task is considered to be more demanding compared to the 
other tasks, since it involves quite a few newly learnt labels. Given the low 
performance in the Dual Naming Task, correlation with false belief understanding 
could not be replicated. 
As to the other tasks, both groups performed similarly on the Retention Task, 
the Alternative Naming Task and the False Belief Tasks. Most importantly, the 
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predicted relationship between the Alternative Naming Task and false belief 
understanding was replicated in bilingual children and remained strong even after 
chronological and verbal mental age were partialed out. A strong correlation was also 
found between the Alternative Naming Task – Across Languages and the False Belief 
Tasks, and the two Alternative Naming Tasks; within and across languages. However, 
since performance in the Alternative Naming Task – Across Languages version 
reached ceiling, associations should be interpreted with caution. 
Bilingual children found the Alternative Naming Task - Across Languages 
version particularly easy; they had minimal difficulty producing an alternative label 
when it was explicitly requested that the name should be in the other language. 
Children are experienced in switching languages in school or even between parents at 
home, if they speak a different language. Given this fact, when tested across languages 
and in the presence of primed context, it is possible they recruit different mechanisms 
from monolinguals to solve this kind of task. Exploring the strategies that bilingual 
children might employ here falls outside the scope of the present thesis, but these data 
form the basis of potential further investigation.  
In the monolingual group, success on the tasks was similar to previous 
experiments and the associations between the Dual Naming Task, the Alternative 
Naming Task and the False Belief Tasks remained strong even after partialing out age 
and verbal mental age.  
Overall, this experiment showed that performance of bilingual children was no 
better than monolinguals, which is consistent to the analysis of bilingual children in 
Experiments 1 to 3. In the case of the Dual Naming Task in bilinguals, the fact that 
children were tested on their weaker language seems to have influenced performance 
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which appeared to be lower compared to monolingual children. The next experiment 
examines a different kind of population; children with Autism spectrum Disorders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 98 
Introduction III - ASD children 
 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a complex neuro-developmental 
condition which involves persistent challenges in social interaction, nonverbal 
communication and speech, and repetitive/restricted behaviours (APA, 2018). With 
regard to word learning and language acquisition, ASD children demonstrate a 
heterogeneity of linguistic abilities ranging from profoundly impaired to very 
advanced. Although for a large proportion of this population communication and 
language challenges are life-long, there are children who might show typical or even 
superior vocabulary development and linguistic skills (de Marchena, Eigsti, Worek, 
Ono, & Snedeker, 2011; Henderson, Powell, Gaskell, & Norbury, 2014; Kjelgaard & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Lyster, Lopez & Lord, 2007; Tager-Flusberg, 2006). 
Despite the fact that ASD children are quite strong in the area of  vocabulary 
development (Tager-Flusberg, Paul, & Lord, 2005), they are still notably impaired in 
their ability to interpret speakers’ referential intent (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1986; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Sabbagh, 1999) and this is tendency shown even by 
individuals who develop average or above average verbal skills (Tager-Flusberg, Paul, 
& Lord, 2005). Even in this case though, most of the ASD children are able to learn 
words by middle childhood (de Marchena et al., 2011). Regarding disambiguation, a 
common assumption that could be made by proponents of the socio-pragmatic account 
could be that children with ASD cannot disambiguate, as their impaired pragmatic 
abilities might hinder inferences for speakers’ referential intent. However, recent 
studies show that ASD children can demonstrate disambiguation attributing novel 
words to novel objects over familiar objects (de Marchena et al., 2011; Hartley, Trainer 
& Allen, 2019; Preissler & Carey, 2005).  
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Here, we present the small number of studies that have examined 
disambiguation in ASD children. In a recent study,  Hartley et al. (2019) presented 
ASD and TD children (mean ages: 8.79 years and 5.57 years respectively) with two 
familiar and one novel object and asked for the referent of a novel name. They also 
included requests for familiar objects in order to prevent children from learning to 
always pick the novel object. Both populations picked the novel objects as the referents 
of the novel words with proportion of success being 100% for TD’s and 90% for 
ASD’s, meaning that ASD children can disambiguate regardless of their impaired 
pragmatic abilities. This is consistent with earlier findings reported by Preissler and 
Carey (2005) who examined disambiguation in 5- to 9-year-old ASD’s. Their 
disambiguation paradigm comprised two trials. In the first trial, children were 
presented with a familiar and a novel drawing, and, in the second trial, they were 
presented with a familiar and novel object. Children consistently chose the novel 
stimuli (75% success for pictures; 89% success for objects) despite their impaired 
ability to use speaker’s gaze direction as a strategy for matching words to objects. 
Also, no performance differences were found between ASD and TD children. 
According to the authors, this indicated ASD children can still disambiguate without 
needing to interpret speaker’s referential intent. 
De Marchena et al. (2011) also examined disambiguation in both ASD and 
typically developing (TD) children. In this study, 68 TD and 48 ASD children were 
tested in the disambiguation paradigm used by Diesendruck and Markson (2001, Study 
1). The paradigm was given both using labels and facts. ASD and typically developing 
children were found to disambiguate equally. However, the effect was stronger for 
words rather than facts. Also, the two effects were uncorrelated, as better 
communication in children predicted stronger disambiguation in facts, indicating that 
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that pragmatic skills might underlie the phenomenon. In contrast, children with better 
vocabulary development were more likely to disambiguate in labels, indicating that 
there might be a connection to lexical skills. Thus, the authors concluded that distinct 
mechanisms underlie label and fact disambiguation. Children did disambiguate despite 
their impaired pragmatic abilities. This confirms Preissler and Carey’s (2005) 
conclusion that children do not need to interpret speakers’s referential intent to pick 
the novel object after hearing a novel name. Various explanations have been proposed 
to explain this finding. De Marchena and collegues have rejected the possibility that 
children with ASD use different mechanisms than typically developing children. They 
explain that it is very unclear how two distinct mechanisms for disambiguation would 
emerge over evolution. Instead, they proposed that disambiguation is not a result of 
children’s pragmatic abilities, but it is either a lexical constraint or a reflection of 
domain-general learning processes. 
As mentioned earlier, the socio-pragmatic account cannot explain 
disambiguation in ASD children. In this experiment, I wanted to examine how ASD 
children perform in referent selection and investigate the potential association their 
theory of mind abilities. 
Theory of mind in children with autism is an ability often acquired with a 
delay compared to typically developing children and ASD children tend to fail 
preschool false belief tasks throughout childhood - even teens in some occasions.  
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) provided one of the first demonstrations by testing ASD 
children (mean age= 11 years, SD=3) and TD children (mean age= 4,5 years, 
SD=0.7) on Perner and Wimmer’s false belief task. Their results showed that the two 
groups performed significantly differently with 80% of the ASD children failing the 
false belief task compared to TD children where only 15% failed. The authors 
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concluded that impaired theory of mind constitutes a specific deficit that is largely 
independent of general intellectual level. These findings were very much consistent 
to those of later studies (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2001; Girli & Tekin, 2010; Hoogenhout 
& Malcolm-Smith, 2014; Peterson, 2009; Siegal & Peterson, 2008).  
In this experiment, I compared the performance of ASD children and 
typically developing children on a series of referent selection tasks - the Dual 
Naming Task, the standard Disambiguation Task, the Pragmatic Cue Task, the 
Alternative Naming Task – and the two False Belief Tasks used throughout this 
thesis. Administering the Dual Naming Task in ASD children is completely novel, as 
well as testing this population on the particular combination of tasks. The 
perspectival account predicts that children who cannot pass the False Belief Tasks 
will also not be able to pass the referent selection tasks were understanding of 
perspective is required, that is the Dual Naming Task, the Pragmatic Cue Task and 
the Alternative Naming Task. Thus, my predictions were: 
1. Performance between the two groups would be similar on the basis that success in 
the referent selection tasks would also correlate with success in the false belief 
tasks.  
2. Previous findings showing that ASD children disambiguate equally to TD 
children would be replicated.  
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Experiment 5 – ASD children 
Method  
Participants. 
Forty-two children participated from five special schools in Sheffield and two 
mainstream/inclusive school in Norwich; 21 ASD children (2 girls; mean age 128 
months, range = 73 – 218, SD = 45 months); 21 typically developing children (10 
girls; mean age 60 months, range = 52 – 68, SD = 5 months. Among the typically 
developing children tested for this study, the selected 21 were the most closely 
matching the ASD children in verbal mental age. ASD’s mean verbal mental age was 
5 years (BPVS mean raw score: 71.88, range = 23 – 140, SD = 31) and TD’s mean 
verbal mental age was 4 years and 8 months (BPVS mean raw score: 62.90, range = 58 
– 70, SD = 3.4). Mean performance on the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices for 
the ASD children was 20.27 (range = 2 – 32, SD = 9.5). Verbal mental age data for 
five ASD children and chronological age data for two ASD children was not available 
at the time of testing. The selection criterion for the ASD children was head-teachers’ 
confirmation that they had an ASD diagnosis and that they were in the position to 
follow a short story and respond to low-demand instructions, such as requests to point 
at objects. Inclusion criteria were informed parental consent and child assent 
immediately prior to testing. The exclusion criterion was children’s reluctance to 
participate or poor understanding of the instructions.  
Design. 
Children completed the Dual Naming Task, the Disambiguation Task (Gollek 
& Doherty, 2016), the Pragmatic Cue Task (Gollek & Doherty, 2016), the Alternative 
Naming Task (Doherty & Perner, 1998) and two False Belief Tasks. The experiment 
was completed in four sessions and each session lasted 10 minutes maximum. The 
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order of the tasks was counterbalanced across participants. The British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale III (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) and the Raven’s Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, 1962) were administered last.  
Stimuli.  
Sixteen pictures depicting unusual toys and household objects and 21 pictures 
depicting familiar objects were used (Appendix G). 
Labels. 
The novel words (wiso, colat, pizer, gake, hinkel, flinder, colat, momtick, kern, 
blicket, pafe, boskot, kita, ente, coodle, puhne) were taken from The Novel Object and 
Unusual Name (NOUN) Database (Horst & Hout, in press) and Gollek (2013). The 
familiar word-pairs were dog-animal, carrot-vegetable, owl-bird, milk-drink and 
apple-fruit.  
Other Materials. 
 A hand-puppet was used as a second speaker to address direct questions to the 
children. A small cardboard model was used as the puppet’s house. False Belief Task 
II was presented on a portable computer with Microsoft Power-point.  
Procedure. 
Dual Naming Task. 
The procedure was identical to previous experiments in this thesis except 
stimuli were pictures instead of objects. 
Disambiguation Task. 
This task is based on Gollek and Doherty’s (2016) disambiguation task. Each 
child was introduced to Jimmy the puppet and then was presented with a familiar 
picture (e.g., a banana) and an unfamiliar picture (e.g., a whisk). The child was asked 
to choose the referent of a novel word through pointing to a picture. There were four 
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trials, each of four trials presented a new set of one unfamiliar and one familiar picture 
and a novel word, and presentation of pictures (left/right) was counterbalanced. The 
wording of the request was as follows: 
 ‘‘Jimmy would like a hinkle; please give Jimmy a hinkle.” 
Pragmatic Cue Task. 
Each child was introduced again to the Puppet. Then, the child was presented 
with a familiar picture (e.g., an apple) and an unfamiliar picture (e.g., a bottle stopper) 
and was told, ‘‘Jimmy is hungry and would like a momtick; please give Jimmy a 
momtick.”. Three additional trials paired novel pictures with familiar objects that 
would satisfy the puppet’s implied need (sleepy, cold, thirsty). There were four trials 
in total and presentation of picures (left/right) was counterbalanced.  
The Alternative Naming Task. 
Vocabulary check. Four sheets of paper were presented individually, each 
displaying six pictures. The child was asked to point to each experimental item twice 
on different sheets: once under the basic label (e.g., ‘‘Show me the cat”) and once 
under the superordinate label (‘‘Show me the animal”).  
Alternative Naming phase. The child was presented with an individual picture 
and told, ‘‘Now, here are some more pictures. Each picture has two names. I am going 
to tell you one name for it, and you can then tell me another name for it. Let’s try that. 
This is fruit. What else is it?”. If a child just repeated the experimenter’s word, the 
experimenter would say “Well, this is what I have said… Any other word for fruit?”. 
After this practice trial, the procedure continued with four pictures (cat, food, owl, 
drink) and then a second time using the alternative labels (animal, burger, bird, milk). 
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The child was asked to provide both superordinate and basic labels to pass a particular 
item. 
False Belief Task I. 
False Belief Task 1 was identical two the previous experiments. 
False Belief Task II. 
The second False belief task was identical to False Belief Task II from 
previous experiments with the difference that this one was in the form of PowerPoint 
presentation. Characters, names and objects depicted were equivalent to those used in 
this task in the previous experiments. 
Standardized measures. 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale III (Dunn & Dunn, 2009) was 
individually administered according to the manual.  
The Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) (Raven, 1962) was also 
used to measure non-verbal, clear-thinking ability and is designed for both typically 
and atypically developing children from 5 to 11 years of age. In the test, each child 
was presented with matrices and was asked to identify the missing item that completes 
a certain pattern. The CPM items were arranged to assess cognitive development up to 
the stage when a child is sufficiently able to reason by analogy and adopt this way of 
thinking as a consistent method of inference. 
 
Results 
Preliminary analysis of the data indicated there were no effects of task order. 
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ASD children. 
Dual Naming Task. 
For three children, data was not collected for this task, as they refused to answer 
the test questions. Table 14 shows children’s choices in the 1st and 2nd request and the 
number of times each type of behaviour was observed.  
Table 14 
Children’s choices in the 1st and 2nd request of the Dual Naming Task 
Ch
ild
re
n’
s c
ho
ic
es
 in
 th
e 
tw
o 
re
qu
es
ts.
 
1st request 2nd request Times choices occurred 
Target Target 22 
Target Distractor 38 
Distractor Target 5 
Distractor Distractor 4 
Target Familiar object 3 
 
Children picked the target in both requests 33% of the times. 15 out of 18 children 
chose the target as the referent of the first request on all four trials, with three children 
each picking a distractor on one, two or three trials each. For the second request, 67% of 
the children picked the target either in one or two trials (Figure 16).  Only 1 child chose 
the target at all times.  
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Figure 16. Percentage of children who picked the target in one, 
two, three, four trials or in no trial in the 2nd request of the Dual 
Naming Task. 
 
Whether the puppet or the experimenter made the second request made no 
statistical difference to the times target was chosen (Table 15). 
Table 15  
Overall number of choices of Distractor/Target in the Dual Naming Task versus speaker in 
typically developing children 
 Speaker asking the 2nd request 
Experimenter Puppet 
Distractor choices 14 12 
Target choices 28 30 
 
Alternative Naming Task. 
Mean performance on the vocabulary check reached ceiling with 99%. In the 
alternative naming phase, children were considered to succeed on a given trial, if they 
provided both names for an item. Also, the training trial used to familiarise children with 
the task is not included in the analysis. Children succeed on 43% of the trials. From this 
total performance, mean performance when children were asked to provide the 
superordinate term (e.g. animal) was much lower - 60% - compared to when the term 
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(e.g. dog) was required - 78%. This difference was statistically significant, t(20)= 1.6, p = 
.013. Figure 16 shows that nearly 40% of the children failed all trials and the second 
biggest proportion of the children provided both names in three trials.  
 
Figure 16. Percentage of children who succeeded in one, two, 
three, four trials or in no trial in Alternative Naming Task. 
 
Disambiguation Task. 
Children picked the familiar picture 18% of the times on average. 62% of the 
children never picked the familiar picture and 33% did so only in one or two trials (Figure 
17). 
 
Figure 17. Percentage of children who chose the familiar picture in 
one, two, three, four trials or in no trial in the Disambiguation Task. 
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Pragmatic Cue Trask. 
Children picked the familiar picture 75% of the times on average. More than 
half of the children picked the familiar picture in all four trials and the rest of the 
percentages were split in one, two or three trials as shown in Figure 18. At this point 
it has to be noted that many of the ASD children exhibited an unusual kind of 
behaviour when given the Pragmatic Cue Task, explicitly suggesting that they were 
not taking the novel word into account. For example, when the experimenter said 
‘‘Jimmy is hungry and would like a momtick; please give Jimmy a momtick.”, children 
grabbed and handed the familiar picture after hearing “hungry” before they heard the 
novel word. The experimenter started taking notes on this behaviour after Participant 
4. This behaviour was recorded for 10 out of the 17 remaining participants in at least 
3 out of 4 trials. 
 
Figure 18. Percentage of children who chose the familiar picture in 
one, two, three, four trials or in no trial in the Pragmatic Cue Task. 
 
False Belief Tasks. 
ASD children passed 40% of false belief trials on average: of 21 children, 7 
passed both False Belief trials (33%), 5 children passed only 1 false belief trials and 9 
children failed both tasks. Seven children on the first false belief task and five children 
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on the second false belief task failed one or both control questions. Among these, one 
child got the belief question correct. Overall, only children who had all three questions 
correct were considered to pass a given False Belief trial. Performance in the False 
Belief Task was strongly correlated with the Alternative Naming Task (Table 16). 
 
Table 16 
Correlations between tasks in ASD children 
 
 
 
Developmental Trajectory. 
      Age did not correlate with any of the tasks (Table 16). 
Comparison of the tasks. 
The Alternative Naming Task and False Belief Task correlated strongly even 
when verbal mental age was partialed out (Table 16). It may be noted that 
performances in the False Belief Task I and II were not equal (mean success at 48% 
and 33% respectively), but this difference did not reach statistical significance, t(20)= 
1.8, p = 0.83. ASD children might have found the PowerPoint version of the False 
 BPVS False 
Belief  
Dual 
Naming  
Disam- 
biguation 
Alterna-
tive 
Naming 
Pragmatic  
Cue  
Age .15 .19 .42 .14 .25 .34 
BPVS - .61* .12 .30 .69** .02 
False Belief     - .02 .20 .77** .08  
Dual Naming   (.01)   - .08  .21  .20 
Disambiguation   (.26) (.05)   - .20 .06 
Alternative Naming  (.61*) (.23) (.35)   - .05 
Pragmatic Cue  (.08) (.06) (.11) (.16)   - 
Note: Correlations after partialing out verbal mental age are presented below the diagonal. 
*     p < 0.05. 
**   p < 0.001. 
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Belief Task less engaging and this factor might have caused lower performance. 
Performance on False Belief Task I correlated highly with performance in the 
Alternative Naming Task, r = .70, p = .004 (VMA partialed out). Also the two False 
Belief Tasks correlated highly with each other, r = .66, p = .007 (VMA partialed out). 
 
Typically developing children. 
Dual Naming Task. 
In the first request, typically developing children picked the target at all times. 
In the second request they chose the target 65% of the times, Figure 19 shows how 
many TD children picked the target in one, two, three, four or none of the trials. 62% 
of the children picked the target either on three or all four trials. 
 
Figure 19. Percentage of TD children who picked the target in one, 
two, three, four trials or in no trial in the 2nd request of the Dual 
Naming Task. 
 
Whether the experimenter or puppet made the second request made no 
statistical difference to which picture was selected by typically developing children 
(see Table 17). 
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Table 17 
Overall number of choices of Distractor/Target in the Dual Naming Task versus speaker in 
typically developing children 
 Speaker asking the 2nd request 
Experimenter Puppet 
Distractor choices 16 14 
Target choices 26 28 
 
Alternative Naming Task.  
Mean performance on the vocabulary check reached ceiling with 100%. 
Children succeeded in 70% of trials. From this total performance, mean performance 
when children were asked to provide the basic term (e.g. dog) was higher - M=88% - 
compared to when the superordinate term (e.g. animal) was required, M=73%. This 
difference was statistically significant, t(20)= -2.4, p < .029. Nearly half of the 
typically developing children (48%) provided both names in all four trials. Figure 20 
shows success by number of trials in TD children. 
 
Figure 20. Percentage of TD children who succeeded in one, two, 
three, four trials or in no trial in Alternative Naming Task. 
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Typically developing children picked the familiar picture 10% of the times on 
average. Figure 21 shows that the majority of the children never picked the familiar 
picture. 
 
Figure 21. Percentage of TD children who chose the familiar picture 
in one, two, three, four trials or in no trial in the Disambiguation Task. 
 
Pragmatic Cue Task. 
Children picked the familiar picture 90% of the time. Figure 22 shows that in 
both groups the majority of the children was consistently choosing the familiar picture 
in all four trials.  
 
Figure 22. Percentage of children who chose the familiar object in 
one, two, three, four trials or in no trial in the Pragmatic Cue Task. 
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Table 18 
Correlations between tasks in TD children 
 
 
 
False Belief Tasks. 
Typically developing children passed 80% of false belief trials on average: of 21 
children, 17 passed both False Belief trials (81%), 2 children failed both tasks and there 
was no child who passed only one false belief trial. One child on the first false belief 
task and one child on the second false belief task failed both control questions. None of 
these children passed the belief question. 
Comparison of the Tasks. 
Contrary to ASD children, in TD children there was a correlation between age 
and the Alternative Naming Task (Table 18). Also, false belief understanding was 
related to children’s performance on the Pragmatic Cue Task and this was the only 
relationship that remained robust after partialing out chronological and verbal mental 
age. There was no correlation between false belief and the Alternative Naming Task as 
found in ASD’s, which was expected as TD children were quite old.  Dual Naming 
 BPVS False 
Belief  
Dual 
Naming  
Disambi-
guation  
Alternative 
Naming  
Pragmatic 
Cue  
Age .82** .18 .30 .01 .53* .38 
BPVS - .39 .49* .12 .55* .69* 
False Belief     - .20 .07 .35 .65* 
Dual Naming   (.05)   - .25 .50* 61* 
Disambiguation   (.01) (.07)   - .08 .24 
Alternative 
Naming 
 (.23) (.36) (.16)   - 51* 
Pragmatic Cue  (.52*) (.39) (.16) (.33)   - 
Note: Correlations after partialing out age and verbal mental age are presented below the diagonal. 
*     p < 0.05. 
**   p < 0.001. 
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Task correlated with Alternative Naming Task and the Pragmatic Cue Task, unlike in 
ASD children.  
Comparisons between ASD’s and TD’s. 
In comparison to TD children, ASD children seem to find the Dual Naming 
Task harder (Table 19); t(35)= -3.2, p < .003. In the Alternative Naming Task, the 
difference in performance between the two groups was again statistically significant; 
t(40)= 2.3, p = .01 (Table 19). In the Disambiguation task and the Pragmatic Cue task, 
performances were similar. In the False Belief Tasks, typically developing children 
were better than ASD’s (U = 121, p = .004). 
 
Table 19 
Mean success in the main tasks among the two groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion  
This experiment examined referent selection in relation to theory of mind 
abilities in children with Autism Spectrum Disorder and also compared performances 
with typically developing children. The predictions for this study were t that success in 
the referent selection tasks would also require success in the false belief tasks, and that 
ASD children would be able to disambiguate replicating in this way previous findings. 
ASD children did disambiguate similarly to TD children. Regarding associations, 
ASD’s performance in the Alternative Naming Task was strongly correlated with 
 ASD children TD children 
Dual Naming Task 33% 64% 
Alternative Naming Task 43% 69% 
Disambiguation Task 82% 90% 
Pragmatic Cue Task 73% 89% 
False Belief Task 40% 80% 
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success in the False Belief Tasks, replicating previous research (Doherty & Perner, 
1998). ASD’s low performance in the Dual Naming Task and TD’s high performance 
in all of the tasks will now be discussed in relation to their chronological and verbal 
mental age. 
Success in the Dual Naming Task was particularly low – 33% compared to 
approximately 50% found in previous experiments -, meaning that these children had 
greater difficulties in applying two names to the same target. Data showed that there 
were times children did not even pick the target in the first request or the distractor was 
picked in both requests or they would even choose familiar objects. Although the 
percentage of these choices was less than 20%, it still constitutes a relatively high 
percentage given TD children in the previous experiments made these kinds of choices 
at a rate less than 1%. This means that ASD children might have not fully understood 
the basics of the task or found it particularly difficult to learn the names.   
This can explain why there was not a relationship between the Dual Naming 
Task in ASD’s and the False Belief Task. To be able to compare performances, children 
need to make two types of choices in the Dual Naming Task; either pick the target on 
both requests, indicating success, or pick the target in the first request and the distractor 
in the second, indicating they learned the first name, but found it difficult to apply the 
second on the same target, as they were unable thus to coordinate both perspectives. 
Since there were other factors contributing to failure, relationship with false belief 
understanding could not stay unaffected.  
ASD children scored high on the Disambiguation Task and the Pragmatic Cue 
Task. The fact that the Disambiguation Task and False Belief Task did not correlate was 
expected, as passing the Disambiguation Task does not require an understanding of 
perspective. In contrast, the Pragmatic Cue Task was expected to correlate with the False 
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Belief task, but that was not the case. ASD children scored high in the Pragmatic Cue 
Task – 75% success- but not in the False Belief Task - 40% success -. However, as 
mentioned in the results, at least 10 out of 21 children exhibited impulsive behaviour 
showing that they ignored the novel names when choosing. Thus, although children 
showed success in the Pragmatic Cue Task, this does not mean they understood the task 
and were able to apply two names on the same familiar object. This shows aspects of 
the way ASD children filter information when being part of a discourse.  
No understanding problems seem to have occurred in the Alternative Naming 
Task, where no atypical behaviour was observed and ASD children scored as expected 
relatively to their verbal mental age. In this case, there was a strong correlation with the 
False Belief Tasks even after partialing out age and verbal mental age, suggesting that 
ASD children need to understand perspective to be able to apply two names to the same 
thing within the same particular conversation, like typically developing children do.  
Compared to ASD children, TD children scored highly in all tasks. As noted in 
Methods, TD children were matched with ASD’s in terms of verbal mental age. This 
resulted in a sample comprising particularly old ASD children (mean age 128 months) 
compared to TD’s whose mean age was 60 months, but also particularly old TD children 
compared to the age ranges I had in the previous experiments (3- to 5-year-olds). So, 
consistent both to literature and the experiments of this thesis, TD’s of this experiment 
found passing the tasks easy. Given the high performances, it was hard to detect 
developmental change and this explains why correlations among the tasks were weak.  
Overall, this experiment showed that similarly to TD children, an understanding 
of perspective is required for ASD children, too, in order to pass the Alternative Naming 
Task. ASD children find the Dual Naming Task particularly difficult and interpret 
differently the Pragmatic Cue Task. Lastly, previous findings showing that ASD 
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children are able to disambiguate despite their impaired pragmatic abilities were 
replicated.   
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General Discussion 
General Findings 
The present thesis examined the development of preschool children’s ability to 
correctly use two newly taught labels for the same object within the same 
conversation. Among five substantial and novel experiments, 331 children from three 
different populations were tested on a variety of metalinguistic and metacognitive 
tasks, while complete verbal mental age data was also recorded.  Throughout the 
experiments, it was found that 3- to 4-year-olds resisted applying both labels to the 
same object and applied the second name to different objects. In contrast, 5- to 6-year-
olds accepted both labels significantly above chance. The likelihood of a child 
applying two names to one object was strongly related to false belief performance and 
remained robust even after partialing out age and verbal mental age. Results were 
extended to two other populations; bilingual and ASD children. The present thesis 
showed that children overcome the confusion multiple labels bring once they develop 
an understanding of perspective.  
To rule out the possibility that children avoided applying the two names to the 
same object for pragmatic reasons specific to this experiment, I adapted the procedure 
in Experiment 3 to include speakers of equal status and deemphasised the contrast 
between the two labels by including intervening requests for familiar objects. These 
manipulations did not alter the findings. Providing children with additional bridging 
information indicating the target as the appropriate choice for both requests did not 
alter performance either. Experiment 3 also showed that weaker-learned names are 
likely to be replaced by familiar ones, but not vice versa. 
Experiments 4 and 5 examined two different populations; bilingual children 
and ASD children. Experiment 1 to 4 showed that success on the multiple labelling 
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tasks requiring understanding of perspective (such as the Alternative Naming Task) is 
associated with success in false belief tasks and is independent of whether a child is 
monolingual or bilingual. Performance was equal between the two groups in 
Experiments 1 to 3. That analysis showed that bilinguals performed similarly to 
monolinguals in the Dual Naming Task and the same pattern of results was found. In 
Experiment 4, in the Greek-English group, Dual Naming Task performance was low, 
arguably due to low confidence. Evidently, whether children are tested in their 
stronger versus weaker language has an impact on their confidence and consequently 
on their success in referent selection tasks involving newly taught names. If children 
were tested on their strong language, I would expect that result patterns would 
replicate and children would have a higher performance in the Dual Naming Task. 
Experiment 5 showed that similarly to TD children, perspectival understanding 
correlates strongly with success in the Alternative Naming Task for ASD children, too. 
Findings for the Disambiguation Task were replicated, as ASD children almost always 
picked the novel object. However, in the Pragmatic Cue Task; although children were 
picking the familiar object, they were doing so before even hearing the novel word. 
Observations suggested they interpreted the task differently and success does not 
imply metalinguistic understanding. Consequently, a potential weakness of the 
Pragmatic Cue Task is that it can be passed by selectively ignoring task information. 
Regarding Experiments 4 and 5, another factor that would be of special interest 
to have examined is inhibitory control. This is because bilinguals have been proposed 
to show better inhibitory control (Bialystok & Martin, 2004) and ASD children have 
been shown to face impairments in this domain (e.g. Robinson, Goddard, Dritschel, 
Wisley & Howling, 2009). Inhibition is plausibly involved in performance of many of 
the current tasks, such as the Dual Naming Task and Alternative Naming Task in both 
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language populations, and the Pragmatic Cue Task in monolinguals. In the Dual 
Naming Task, successful application of both novel labels to the same target potentially 
involves inhibiting assigning the second novel label to another novel object where no 
name has been assigned, and in the Alternative Naming Task, success could 
hypothetically require children inhibiting the name provided by the experimenter in 
order to produce the alternative. As to the Pragmatic Cue Task, successful use of the 
pragmatic cue potentially involves inhibiting a tendency to apply novel names to novel 
objects. The development of inhibition is also thought to be very much related to 
theory of mind as well. Gollek and Doherty (2016) did examine inhibition in relation 
to performance on the Pragmatic Cue and False Belief Task and found no relation 
between performances on a test of executive inhibition (Day–Night Stroop 
after Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994) and the Pragmatic Cue Task. Performance on 
the inhibition task was unrelated to the False Belief task, too; a finding not that 
uncommon (see Montgomery & Koeltzow, 2010, for a review). Thus, given the 
similarity of the tasks between Gollek and Doherty’s study and the current thesis, I 
speculate that I also would not find strong relations between performance on the 
current referent selection tasks, theory of mind and inhibition in monolinguals and 
bilinguals. This might not have been the case though in Experiment 5 with ASD 
children.  
As mentioned earlier, many of the ASD children who were picking the familiar 
object in the Pragmatic Cue task were doing so before even hearing the novel word. 
Successful use of the pragmatic cue, in this case, potentially involves inhibiting the 
tendency to directly pick the familiar object as soon as children hear the pragmatic 
cue. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate whether these children would also 
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show decreased inhibitory control, which would explain their impulse to pick the 
familiar object before even listening to the novel name.   
With regard to the developmental trajectory, results are consistent with prior 
work examining children’s ability to assign a second name to an object they already 
know another name for. In the Pragmatic Cue Task, Gollek and Doherty (2016) and 
Haryu (1991) found that roughly half the 4-year-olds and most 5-year-olds were able 
to choose a familiar object as a referent of a novel label, contrary to 3-year-olds who 
persistently chose the novel object.  
The most important finding of this study is the strong association between 
performance on the Dual Naming Task and theory of mind development. Children 
who passed the False belief tasks were significantly more likely to accept both names 
within the same conversation regardless of common associations with age and verbal 
mental age. Thus, we conclude that Dual Naming, Pragmatic Cue and False Belief 
tasks all involve a common conceptual development, the understanding of perspective. 
Theoretical considerations 
The basic claim of the lexical constraints account is that children assume words 
are mutually exclusive and avoid lexical overlap acts as a word learning strategy 
(Markman & Wachtel, 1988). Savage and Au used a modified version of the lexical 
constraints account to account for performance on the dual naming task.  Children 
hold both words in mind as equally plausible hypotheses, but as new information 
comes in, they commit to one label. If the other label is deleted, it should be treated as 
a completely novel word, and thus would be subject to typical disambiguation effects.  
Thus, when the label is rejected in the Dual Naming task and then presented in the 
presence of the target and the unnamed distractor, children should select the distractor.  
However, we found in the Retention task that the majority of even the youngest 
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children selected the target.  This strongly suggests children do not delete one of the 
two names.  They are not treating the names as mutually exclusive. 
It is likewise difficult to apply the socio-pragmatic account to our findings. 
According to this theory, children learn words by making inferences about other 
people’s communicative intentions.  The Dual Naming Task was adopted to make 
communicative intentions clear. In the training phase, speakers used co-referential 
novel names for an object.  Only one object was named in this way and it was named 
explicitly. Clark’s principles allow for identical reference and contrast in other types of 
meaning, and even very young children are supposed to be aware of this.  It appears 
that children make the inference that the labels are co-referential at this stage because 
they almost always chose correctly for whichever label is used in the test phase. What 
needs to be explained is why when the second label is used children might conclude 
the speaker intends to refer to something else rather than pick out the same object 
from a different perspective. 
When there is only one speaker, as in Savage and Au’s study, it would 
certainly be unusual for a speaker to refer to the same object in two ways without 
further elaboration.  However, two speakers may plausibly use different names for 
several reasons: they each only know one label, they each have a preferred label, or 
each intend to present the object under differing perspectives.  Consistent with these 
interpretations, each speaker uses the same label throughout.  Speakers might be 
interpreted as disagreeing about which label should be used.  However, this 
interpretation is only plausible if they refer to the same object consecutively. As 
shown in Experiment 3, when objects were labelled consecutively children were in 
fact slightly less likely to choose a distractor.  
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Further data from Experiment 3 can also not be explained by the socio-
pragmatic account. Apart from adding intervening requests, I also had two puppets 
naming the objects, rather than a puppet and the experimenter like in the previous 
experiments. This was done in order to completely exclude the possibility that children 
might prefer the experimenter’s label because she potentially is a more authoritative 
source. Results showed that this manipulation had no effect on performance; children 
performed equally either with two puppets or one puppet and the experimenter.  
The socio-pragmatic account cannot explain the data from the “bridging 
information” version of the task either. In that task, children were given additional 
information on how the two novel words relate, which was an unambiguous indication 
that the target was the intendent referent for both requests. Since that was clear, the 
pragmatic account would expect that children would utilize this information and pick 
the target at both times. Still, young children avoided lexical overlap and success in 
the Dual Naming Task was still predicted by success in the false belief task - similarly 
to previous experiments.  
Experiment 5 tested a population that is known for their impaired pragmatic 
abilities; ASD children. Since the socio-pragmatic account claims typically developing 
children disambiguate thanks to their ability to make use of two basic pragmatic 
principles – conventionality and contrast -, this account would also predict that ASD 
children will not be able to disambiguate. Our data replicated previous findings 
showing that ASDs disambiguated as much as TDs. Most importantly, it showed that 
success in False Belief Tasks predicted success in the Alternative Naming Task, which 
also requires an understanding of perspective. 
However, although the lexical constraints and the pragmatic account cannot readily 
explain this data, the three accounts we have been considering could potentially be 
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compatible, but with some modifications.  The lexical principles account is essentially 
behavioural: children behave as if word extensions are mutually exclusive. Researchers 
have questioned whether this behaviour results from an implicit or a metalinguistic 
assumption (e.g., Merriman & Bowman, 1991); Markman (1989) speculated on whether it 
reflects a specifically linguistic principle or a belief that objects have only one identity; 
other researchers have suggested that the hypothetical bias is an emergent property of the 
lexicon (e.g., Merriman & Stevenson, 1997; Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum (2009).  
However, these speculations have not progressed beyond matters of conjecture.  
The perspectival account advanced here provides a potential theoretical 
underpinning for the behaviour.  Failure to consider perspective differences will lead to 
treating any novel word as referring to something not already named in a given 
conversation.  This would account for most or all of the evidence taken to support the bias.  
This claim differs in nuance from the typical descriptions of the bias in two main ways: It 
is restricted to a specific conversation.  Thus, it does not necessarily create any difficulties 
learning overlapping labels.  As long as a potential referent has not been named, explicitly 
or implicitly, it can take a novel label.  In early debate around the bias, the many 
overlapping terms in children’s lexicons was argued to be an insuperable problem for the 
ME bias theory (e.g., Nelson, 1988).  The perspectival account provides a ready 
explanation for the apparent contradiction.  
The second difference to standard descriptions of the bias is that it does not exist to 
aid word learning.  Nevertheless, it constrains the number of hypotheses children can 
entertain for the meaning of a novel word, and would thus serendipitously confer the word-
learning benefits hypothesised for the bias.  Other than these two differences, the 
perspectival account is consistent with the lexical principles account, and provides a 
potential theoretical underpinning for it. 
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 The socio-pragmatic account is similar to the perspectival account to the extent that 
both posit an association between theory of mind abilities, disambiguation and related 
effects. The most salient difference regards the age at which these abilities are taken to 
develop. The socio-pragmatic account takes understanding of perspective in both labelling 
and theory of mind to develop in infancy.  Present data call this into question: they 
demonstrate that the two abilities are associated developmentally, but find that children 
begin to understand perspective in labelling at four years, rather than in infancy. 
This claim relates to the age from which theory of mind develops.  This is currently a 
matter of vigorous debate (see Dörrenberg, Rakoczy, & Liszkowski, 2018, and 
Baillargeon, Buttelmann, & Southgate, 2018, for recent discussion of the empirical status 
of infant theory of mind). However, this is beyond the direct scope of the current study, 
since our data on theory of mind are restricted to explicit false belief understanding in 
preschool.  For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the distinction between the 
perspectival and socio-pragmatic accounts is primarily empirical. 
To recap the basic claim of the perspectival account is that young children are 
conceptually unable to think about perspective.  This means that once having taken a 
perspective on an object or situation, they are unable to switch perspective of their 
own volition. Children’s perspective can be switched externally.  In the case of 
naming, this can involve an adult asserting a label for an object different from the one 
the child has used. The Dual Naming task involves different teachers asserting words 
on the same object, then examines the ability of the child to endogenously switch 
between the words.  The prediction was that the ability to do this will arise between 
the ages of 3 to 5 years and be specifically associated with the false belief 
understanding, as a well-established measure of conceptual perspective taking.  This 
prediction was confirmed in each experiment. The Retention task suggests that 
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children maintained the mappings of both words to the object throughout the task. In 
addition, performance on the Pragmatic Cue task (Gollek & Doherty, 2016) also 
correlated with performance on both the Dual naming and False Belief tasks, beyond 
common associations with age and verbal mental age.  
Bilingual data from Experiments 1 to 3 further showed that performance was 
not influenced by bilingual status. When compared to monolinguals, bilinguals from 
the first three experiments performed equally in the main tasks and associations with 
false belief understanding were maintained. Experiment 4 yielded similar results, but 
not for the Dual Naming Task, since Greek bilinguals’ performance was particularly 
low arguably due to the confidence factor. The absence of bilingual differences in 
referent selection performance is consistent with the big corpus of studies showing no 
such differences in preschool age (see metanalysis by Lewis et al., 2019).  
The perspectival account predicts no qualitative differences in the development 
of monolinguals and bilinguals in relation to dual naming performance. Here, this 
prediction is confirmed by the bilingual data in Experiments 1 to 3 and bilingual data 
from both Alternative Naming Tasks and the False Belief Tasks in the Experiment 4. 
Caution is needed though when interpreting data from bilinguals tested across 
languages; it is possible that children may have developed strategies to help them 
switch between languages that do not require perspectival understanding.  
   
Conclusions 
The present thesis found that children between the ages of 3 and 5 find it 
difficult to apply two newly taught names to the same novel object within the same 
particular conversation. However, they were able to remember the names when these 
were presented separately. Success in the Dual Naming Task improved with age and 
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was strongly associated with false belief understanding even after controlling for 
chronological age and verbal mental age. Bilingual status affects neither overall 
performance nor the strong association between the tasks requiring an understanding 
of perspective. Regarding ASD children, for the tasks that were appropriate for this 
population, the above association remained strong. Thus, typically developing 
monolingual, bilingual and ASD children need to reach metacognitive developments 
such as the understanding of perspective in order to be able to apply two names on the 
same thing within the same particular situation. 
These findings may have various practical implications, as understanding the 
way children process novel names might prove to be important for employing the 
appropriate practices both in educational settings and at home. This can lead to 
activities targeting children’s language development that are tailored-made with regard 
to their age, vocabulary and perspective-taking abilities. Further, our results from the 
Pragmatic Cue Task, showed that ASD children process pragmatic information about 
objects and names in a unique way compared to typically developing children. This 
finding could be taken into account and utilised by applied psychologists when 
developing intervention tools aiming at improving ASD’s language comprehension 
and communication.  
These findings have also important theoretical implications, as they add to the 
understanding of the mutual exclusivity bias and redirect the focus of its scope. Until 
so far, the ME bias was seen as a test case for theories of word learning aided either by 
lexical principles or theory of mind. In fact, the present thesis indicates that the ME 
bias data do not support either position. Rather than being a strategy aiding word 
learning, the ME bias is in fact a result of cognitive immaturity; children do not avoid 
lexical overlap by choice, they are just not able yet to realize that two names can apply 
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to the same entity at the same time. Children overcome this restriction around the age 
of 4. The perspectival account supports a general metacognitive development 
occurring at that time – not just in theory of mind, but also in metalinguistic 
awareness. This thesis confirms this claim and shows conversations can proceed 
without complex tracking of common ground. 
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Appendix A 
Novel words, novel objects and familiar objects used for the Dual Naming Task, 
Experiment 1 
 
Novel words 
 jintoff  
punhe  
hinkel 
 cheedor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Novel objects 
 
 
 
 
Familiar 
objects 
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Appendix B 
 
Novel words, novel objects and familiar objects for the Dual Naming Task, Experiment 2 
 
Novel words 
bubit 
welne 
tachte 
puhne 
blicket 
ente 
boskot 
slider 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Familiar objects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Novel objects 
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Novel words, pragmatic cues, novel objects and familiar objects used for Pragmatic Cue 
Task, Experiment 2 
 
Novel words Pragmatic Cues Familiar objects Novel Objects 
cheedor hungry 
  
hinkel sleepy 
  
jintoff thirsty 
  
momtick cold 
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Appendix C 
Novel words, novel objects and familiar objects used for Dual Naming Task, Experiment 
3 
 
Novel words Novel objects Familiar objects 
kern 
  
blicket 
  
boskot 
  
pafe  
  
tever 
  
eder  
  
pabe 
  
coodle 
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Novel words, novel objects and familiar objects for Dual Naming Task – Familiar Target, 
Experiment 3 
 
Novel words Novel objects Familiar objects 
lozee 
  
jintoff  
  
cheedor  
  
ente 
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Novel words, novel objects and familiar objects used for Dual Naming Task – Bridging 
information, Experiment 3 
 
Novel words Novel objects Familiar objects 
Montick 
  
hinkel  
  
kuble  
  
Delsy 
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Appendix D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
False Belief Task II 
 
 
 
False Belief Task I 
 
 
 
Puppets and House 
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Appendix E 
Novel words, novel objects and familiar objects used for Dual Naming Task, Experiment 4 
Novel words Novel objects Familiar objects 
bubit 
  
welne 
  
tachte 
  
puhne 
  
blicket 
  
ente 
  
boskot 
  
cheedor 
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Appendix F 
Pictures used for the Alternative Naming Task, Experiment 4 and 5 
Vocabulary check cards Test Phase cards 
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Pictures used for the Alternative Naming Task – Cross language version, Experiment 4  
Vocabulary check cards Test Phase cards 
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Appendix G 
 
Novel words, novel pictures and familiar pictures used for Dual Naming Task, 
Experiment 5 
 
Novel words Novel pictures Familiar pictures 
kern 
 
 
blicket 
 
 
boskot 
 
 
pafe  
 
 
kita 
  
ente 
  
puhne 
  
coodle 
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Novel words, pragmatic cues, novel pictures and familiar pictures used for Pragmatic Cue 
Task, Experiment 5 
 
Novel 
words 
Pragmatic 
Cues 
Familiar 
pictures 
Novel 
Pictures 
 
flinder 
 
hungry 
  
 
hinkel 
 
sleepy 
 
 
 
jintoff 
 
thirsty 
  
 
momtick 
 
cold 
 
 
 
 
 
Novel words, novel pictures and familiar pictures used for Pragmatic Cue Task, 
Experiment 5 
 
Novel  
words 
Familiar  
pictures 
Novel  
pictures 
 
 
gake 
 
 
 
 
 
wiso 
  
 
colat  
 
 
pizer 
  
 
 
 
